Should the West Prepare an Off-ramp to End the War?

Harlan Ullman:
We’re deadlocked.

The American policy is not to negotiate, Putin has said no to negotiations. And so the American expectation is that ultimately the battlefield will cause so much Russian bled to be let, that Putin will have no option except to make concessions and negotiate. I don’t think that’s a good idea.

Simone Gao:

On September 30, in a speech on celebrating the four states merged into the Russian federation after the so-called referendum. Putin hinted at a nuclear attack.

Putin:

In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.

Simone Gao:
it’s one thing that, uh, you know, whether Putin’s threats are real. It’s another thing whether Putin thinks his, uh, threats could make a difference.

Harlan Ullman:

Putin understands shock and awe, the threat of nuclear weapons, certainly over a cold winter when combined with energy shortages in Europe, are gonna be taken quite seriously.

Simone Gao:

The world is on edge over Putin’s nuclear threat. Could he really do it? Is there still an offramp to end the war? I spoke with Harlan Ullman, former naval officer, author of multiple books, and Senior Advisor of the Atlantic Council about this and more.

I am Simone Gao, and you are watching Zooming In.

Simone Gao:
Thank you, Mr. Ullman for joining Zooming In today.

Harlan Ullman:
I’m delighted to be with you.

Simone Gao:
Okay. Congratulations on your new book. And I would like to discuss with you on that book a little bit later. But first I wanna discuss the war over Ukraine. is that okay with you?

Harlan Ullman:
Of course.

Simone Gao:
Okay. So last week, Putin gave a long speech accepting the four states into the Russian Federation after the so-called referendum. In that speech, Putin made the nuclear threat. But other than that part, what is your overall impression of that speech? And Putin’s psychological state right now.

Harlan Ullman:
In my book, which will get to the Fifth Horseman and the New Man, I have three chapters on Vladimir Putin and China’s president Xi Jinping. You need to read that speech of annexation very carefully. He used the nuclear reference to Hiroshima, but he also used the reference to Dresden, in which that German city was obliterated by a combination of US and British bombers using conventional weapons. I think the point he was alluding to is that the West was evil and destructive rather than the threat of nuclear weapons. However, the fact of the matter is, imagine a worst case for President Putin. Imagine the call up of 300,000 reservists doesn’t work. Suppose the Ukrainian military continues its advance in the Northeast, around and in the South against Kherson, and the Russian military is forced to retreat. And indeed, people are afraid that it might even break.

Harlan Ullman:
What does Putin do? So I think that we need to take the nuclear threat seriously, but I think it’s very, very unlikely because I do not think the nuclear threat is something that would be to Putin’s advantage. But when you’re talking about nuclear weapons, there’s no such thing as a small nuclear weapon. One kilo ton, which is about 1/20 of the size of the bombs that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is worth a thousand tons of TNT, a thousand tons, and a megaton, which is an H-bomb, a hydrogen bomb, is a million tons of TNT. These are extraordinarily powerful weapons. And so I think if Putin were to use nuclear weapons, I don’t think he’d do it to obliterate Kyiv, because that would destroy the state. And if he did use them, I think that the United States and the West have the capability through conventional weapons, basically missiles and standoff attack to destroy the Russian army in Ukraine.

Harlan Ullman:
And make no mistake, we would devastate it, and it would no longer be a fighting force. What’s interesting is that later this month of October celebrates the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was arguably the most dangerous nuclear standoff during the Cold War. What happened was that when John Kennedy was elected president, he had run on a promise to rebuild America’s defense thinking there was a huge missile gap. There was a missile gap, but the Russians, the Soviets, were miles and miles behind. They had virtually no strategic weapons. And so Kennedy began this arms build up at the same time that Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union, had started two years before a huge defense build down. So in many ways, Khrushchev was forced to respond because the build down meant that he could transfer scarce rubles to the Soviet civil side of the budget and improve people’s lives, putting short range nuclear weapons into Cuba really out-flanked America’s strategic advantage.

Harlan Ullman:
But of course, as we know, the Americans found out, and of course, because of geography, Cuba being only 90 miles off the Florida coast, and the fact that we had an overwhelming strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, Khrushchev was forced to withdraw. I make that analogy because President Kennedy did two things that were very sensible. He formed an excom, an executive committee of outside experts to advise him, and he had excellent communications directly with Nikita Khrushchev, in part through Anatoly Dobrynin, who was a well respected Soviet ambassador in Moscow. Now, I make those two points because President Biden has not convened an executive committee. I’m not sure whether he has enough people advising him who know Putin well enough and are providing him all the advice he needs. And communications with Russia do not seem to be very good. Now, where are we?

Harlan Ullman:
We’re deadlocked. The American policy is not to negotiate, to give Ukraine enough weapons for them to defend themselves without escalating the war. As I said, no to negotiations, Putin has said no to negotiations. And so the American expectation is that ultimately the battlefield will cause so much Russian blood to be let, that Putin will have no option except to make concessions and negotiate. I don’t think that’s a good idea. I think there should be lines of diplomacy that are open to begin to discuss how this can end. But right now, we’re deadlocked, Ukrainians and the Americans aren’t gonna give in. The Russians aren’t gonna give in. Nuclear weapons have been threatened. The war is escalating, and there’s no apparent off threat. And then you overlay that with other crises over Taiwan, what’s happening in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf, the fact that the OPEC and Russia are gonna cut back on oil inflation and elections in the United States.

Harlan Ullman:
And we have far too many crises and potential crises that are ongoing right now. So this is a very perilous time. And indeed, that’s why I hope that Mr. Biden will solicit opinion beyond his own people inside the government and establish some kind of diplomatic inroads, possibly through China or India or Turkey or France with Russia. So we can begin to see how we can put an end to this conflict in which thousands of people are dying. Ukraine is being destroyed, and this is a war at this stage that has no positive outcome, at least as far as most people can see.

Simone Gao:
Let’s talk about Putin’s off front a little bit later. You know, first, former CIA director General David Petraeus said yesterday that there is virtually nothing that Russia can do that can make a difference. He also said that the Russians do not appear to be all that prepared for some kind of nuclear activity, the preparations you have to take before you do that, otherwise your own soldiers would be vulnerable. So my question is, you know, first of all, do you agree with him? Do you think Putin’s threats are real? And also, it’s one thing whether Putin’s threats are real. It’s another thing whether Putin thinks his threats could make a difference.

Harlan Ullman:
I agree. General Petraeus has got a, he’s a terrific general, he’s a great strategist, he’s a brilliant guy. He’s also a good friend of mine, and I agree with him. Imagine if the incompetence that the Russian military has shown persist in their nuclear weapons. I mean, that’s really frightening. And the Russian army has got absolutely no experience in a nuclear battlefield. So even if the order were to be given, and there are several lines of chains of command, it’s not just Putin. There are at least two ranks of generals that he’s gotta go through. I’m not sure how competent the Russians would be in using them, and they have no idea about how to operate in a nuclear battlefield. So those are constraints. But having said that, Putin understands shock and awe, as you may know, that I was the original author of Shock and Awe, and the threat of nuclear weapons, certainly over a cold winter when combined with energy shortages in Europe, are gonna be taken quite seriously, certainly by the Alliance. So at this stage, I think he views this as a psychological weapon to affect will and perception. I think it’s unlikely that nuclear weapons will be used, but I didn’t think Putin would be stupid enough to invade Ukraine. And so we’ve gotta take that seriously and prepare for it. But you’re right, and General Petraeus is right. The Russian army has no preparations for using these weapons, and it could turn out to be a huge disaster for them if indeed they did.

Simone Gao:
Hmm. Okay. So if this threats would not be realized in the end, should the West take it seriously?

Harlan Ullman:
Absolutely, absolutely. You need to take these threats seriously, because supposing he uses it, even if it was a 5 or 10% chance. And I think we’ve done that. I’m sure that the Pentagon has done lots of war gaming. I’m sure that when National Security advisor, Jake Sullivan said the consequences would be catastrophic, I’m sure the Russians know that we would eliminate basically most of their military forces in Ukraine and certainly in Crimea and sink the Black Sea Fleet. And we can do that. He can’t. We can. So I think that in itself will be a real constraint to what Russia could do. But imagine a worse case. Imagine this is now Russia 1917, the protests get out of hand. People are fleeing the draft. He’s got a really chaotic situation. The Army is losing badly. Is he gonna surrender? Surrender is gonna mean perhaps giving up his leadership role in a potentially bloody coup. So given the fact that they’ve got some 2000 so-called theater or tactical nuclear weapons, you have to leave open that option, even though it’s very, very unlikely it would be used. And I think we’ve done that. I think we’re prepared the best we can, and I think that alone should be, as I said, a sufficient way to prevent and constrain Putin from considering their use.

Simone Gao:
Hmm. Okay. So do you think Putin is now backed into a corner? Other than the nuclear weapons, does he have any other options?