How Xi’s Most Powerful “Ideas Man” Got America Wrong?| Zooming In China

Hello everyone. Welcome to Zooming In China Tea Time. I’m Simone Gao. I am suffering from allergies on my face so I will not appear on camera this time. Sorry about that. 

Dubbed “almost certainly the most dangerous man in the world that most folks have never heard of” by Washington Post columnist Hugh Hewitt, Wang Huning is emerging as a source of intrigue for academic and political leaders trying to understand the rapidly changing tides of Chinese politics. A man notorious for his comfort in the shadows of Chinese presidents who seeks no political limelight for himself, Wang is reported to have carried tremendous influence over the last three leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and to be the central figure behind Xi Jinping’s major policy reforms.

According to an October 2021 article in Palladium, written by a China expert using the pseudonym N.S. Lyons, the “sudden wave of new government policies that are currently upending Chinese life in what state media has characterized as a ‘profound transformation of the country,” policies that are commonly referred to as Xi Jinping’s “Common Prosperity” campaign, are the brainchild of Wang Huning. 

Recently, I read Wang Huning’s popular memoir America Against America, written after a 6 month stay in the United States. I have to say his knowledge of Western political philosophy, American history, and American politics went well beyond my expectations, leaving me with the impression that he is a diligent, rigorous and qualified scholar. Despite that theoretical rigor used in his memoir, however, I don’t think he understands the essence of the American order. Does that matter? Yes it does. Wang is now charged with charting a way forward for the world’s second most powerful nation. In that role, he has chosen to view the U.S. as a negative lesson, an example of what not to do when defining China’s path. He is also choosing to define and build China’s strengths in opposition to America’s perceived weaknesses.  

With China’s economic size and ambition, any political or economic move it makes will have an impact on the world. We have only to think about the impact that Nazism had on the world to understand that ideas have consequences. 

Yet for all Wang’s clear persuasive power with the presidents he has served under, I do not believe he yields as much power as author N.S. Lyons claims. Lyons claims that Xi Jinping’s strength is sufficient to tolerate very smart people around him and that Wang, as the brightest of the bunch, survived into Xi’s regime because of it.  

I believe this judgment to be wrong. I don’t believe that Xi Jinping is strong enough to tolerate dissent and highly intelligent people. Instead, he is faction-minded. He trusts and uses only those people from where his old posts were in Zhejiang and Fu Jian province which caused a grave alienation of the rest of the CCP bureaucracy. Wang Huning did not survive into the Xi Jinping regime because of Xi Jinping’s broadmindedness. He survived because of his political cunning, a cunning that has allowed him to gain the trust of three generations of Chinese leaders, especially with Xi Jinping who only trusts his own people. 

In Lyons’ reading of the book “America against America”, he found that Wang “marvels at homeless encampments in the streets of Washington DC, out-of-control drug crime in poor black neighborhoods in New York and San Francisco, and corporations that seemed to have fused themselves to and taken over responsibilities of government. Eventually, [Wang] concludes that America faces an ‘unstoppable undercurrent of crisis’ produced by its societal contradictions, including between rich and poor, white and black, democratic and oligarchic power, egalitarianism and class privilege, individual rights and collective responsibilities, cultural traditions and the solvent of liquid modernity. In the end, [Wang believes that] ‘the American economic system has created human loneliness’ as its foremost product, along with spectacular inequality.”

Obviously the American trip had an impact on his views on liberal democracy; that change conveniently fits with the Chinese political shift right after the 1989 democratic movement. After the Tiananmen  massacre, the CCP started to crack down on Western liberal thought, believing that was the cause of the democratic movement. A few years later, though, China’s then de facto leader Deng Xiaoping directed the country to open up and began the economic reform. There was no indication, however, that Wang Huning went along with Deng Xiaoping’s vision. 

That said, I believe Wang’s different policy prescriptions for three Chinese leaders speaks more to a desire to serve the current regime and ruler than to individual ideological shifts on the part of Wang. To survive through three Chinese leaders, Wang needed to tailor his ideas of governance toward not only the needs of the Communist Party as a whole but also the unique preferences of each leader. The political and social shifts now being attributed to Wang may not be fully his own but rather represent adaptations made to pacify each new leader. 

But whether the political ideologies are Wang’s own or are adaptations to the thinking of his employers, it remains true that this key advisor to three generations of CCP leaders holds great influence over China’s future directions and, as such, is worthy of study.

Much of the ideology that Wang Huning consistently holds is centered on the idea that value systems shape a country’s political system and when the central values of a nation crumble, the nation itself will follow. In one of his most cited works, his 1988 article “China’s Changing Political Culture,” Wang argues for an urgent review of how Chinese society’s “’software (culture, values, attitudes) shapes political destiny as much as its ‘hardware’ (economics, systems, institutions).”

Wang argued that “Since 1949, we have criticized the core values of the classical and modern structures but have not paid enough attention to shaping our own core values.” He went on to say that “There are no core values in China’s most recent structure,” making a daring negative claim about China’s socialism with Chinese characteristics.

In America Against America, Wang turns that critical eye toward the political ideologies and practices of the United States. He quotes extensively from American conservative political philosopher Alan Bloom’s book The Closing of the American Mind. Bloom advocated for the promotion of Western cultural traditions and civilizations, praising the cultural and spiritual creations of Plato, Socrates, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Shakespeare, Bacon and others. He believed in the use of these heritages to spread the Western civilization and cultural spirit. 

Wang, however, believed that America was trending toward a deviation from those Western cultural traditions and toward nihilism. He argued that nihilism as the new American way would have a fatal impact on the American spirit and would eventually impact the entire democratic system. 

I believe that Wang Huning’s insight into this U.S. ideological trend was both profound and rare in 1988. Wang’s background as a successful professor and political philosopher combined with his rare opportunity to observe the U.S. first-hand at some of its elite educational institutions gave him the ability to see broadly and deeply. In doing so, he hit the nail on the head: America was built on an idea, one so central to its fabric and identity that if that idea disappears, the social system and national identity disappear along with it. Impressive, right?

He got the basic trend right. His understanding of why, however, reveals his limitations.

Wang Huning quoted a substantial portion of Bloom’s argument in his book, but he left out a key argument of the author. Bloom believed that American nihilism developed from the relativity of values instilled in college education at the time. The theory of value relativity says that there is no objective standard of right or wrong in this world. All good and bad, right and wrong are relative and subjective. One culture may have one set of criteria for knowing what is right or wrong, while another culture has different criteria. Because there is no objective standard, any value could be accepted. Which philosophical school or ideology holds the view of value relativism? Marxism. It stands in opposition to the philosophical thinking of the Eastern and Western traditions. Judeo-Christianity, Greco-Roman culture, and Eastern philosophies such as Buddhusim, Taoism and Confucianism all believe that there is an objective and eternal moral order in this world, and its standards come from God or heaven.

Why didn’t Wang Huning mention the theory of value relativity? Because his academic foundation is Marxism. While he affirms Bloom’s argument that America is moving toward nihilism, he cannot accept the argument that the move toward nihilism is because of value relativity and the loss of faith in God. 

This has a profound impact on his research and perspective on the United States. I believe that his core idea, that the value system shapes the political system, is correct. Yet, Wang Huning did not explain why the quality and origin of such a value system matters. That is a direct effect of his intrinsic belief in the relativity of value, the lack of an objective and eternal right or wrong. He believes that any value system that could be applied to his society and bring economic prosperity and strength to the country is a good value system. He further believes that China can create a more efficient and effective value system than the United States. 

This idea is very dangerous. It may lead China once again to the old path of so-called social and human nature transformation that has happened both inside and outside of China. The Cultural Revolution is a perfect example. It meant to better the human nature of the bourgeoisie and intellectuals by eliminating the traditional Chinese culture they were immersed in and sending these people to the countryside, forcing them to do hard labor so that they can shape the proletarian consciousness.

From the perspective of conservative thinking, Wang Huning’s theory of a value system that excludes moral judgment fails to grasp the essence of the American order. He does not understand what makes America great; He also does not understand what would make America decline. Therefore, his remedy for China that was meant to avoid America’s mistakes is destined to fail. 

That’s all for today. Thanks for watching Zooming In China Tea Time. Please like, share, subscribe and donate to this program if you like my content. Also, head over to my membership site at zoomingin.tv. You can get video/audio formats of my shows, full transcripts, and in-depth reports available only to members. I will also do live Q & A shows with members on the website. Just $5 a month, and you can cancel anytime. Please check it out.

China Uses Animal Disease Control Methods on Humans to Maintain Covid-Zero: Dr. Sean Lin

Speaker 1:

Sean, thank you for joining zooming in today,

Speaker 2:

Simone. Uh, my pleasure to join your program. Thank you for inviting me.

Speaker 1:

okay. Let’s talk about China’s COVID zero policy and the situation in Shean today is the 15th day of Shanna’s lockdown. And, uh, I just saw a video uploaded today by a person from Shean and, uh, you can see the streets are still empty and the government said the risks of large scale rebound of the virus has been reduced to the minimum thanks to their policy. So do you think that COVID zero policy worked once again in Ian?

Speaker 2:

Uh, I, I think first, uh China’s um, zero out policies never work in the past. So many people think that Chinese government had a successful zero campaign when they deal with the Wuhan outbreak last year in 2020. Uh, but I don’t think that was actually a successful example because, uh, the governments, uh, conceal the information regarding how many people were hospitalized. How many people have severe diseases, how many people die, especially the death, or was a top national secret by the Chinese government. So we don’t know how they actually, uh, contain the epidemic, uh, in Wuhan. And after that, the death toll nationwide for Chinese communist parties, it’s a, it’s a part of, it’s a mysterious, low number that is abnormal. Nobody can believe that, um, attack rate the death rate for such a, uh, epidemic disease will be such a low level. It’s impossible.

Speaker 2:

government worldwide make, uh, may not think deeply or may not, uh, realize that they, uh, subconsciously thinking that the Chinese government had a successful way to deal with the epidemic. So may any government have been using different, uh, lockdown policy, try to, uh, mimic what Chinese government did in Wuhan? So actually I think that’s a very big example. And now I think in,

Speaker 1:

Okay, just before you go to more details, I mean the Chinese governments, obviously they, uh, you know, cover the truth all the time, but compared to other methods, maybe the Chinese government thinks, uh, that the, you know, the quarantine, the lockdown policy, zero out policy is still the best. All of all the other policies, that’s why they’re using it. And otherwise they, they don’t have to use this method. Right.

Speaker 2:

Uh, I think, um, this is actually a ideological issue for the Chinese government. They are not treating the Chinese people as a, a normal human being in terms of, in the disease outbreak or control situation. To me, the Chinese government is treating the Chinese people like, uh, livestock like animals. So in essence, they are human. Uh, I infectious disease, outbreak control. They are more like doing animal or livestock epidemic control. Uh, the reason I’m saying that is because they’re policy wise, uh, you can see, uh, the almost, almost very similar if you look at China’s animal, uh, disease, uh, control, uh, legislation as well with China, current policy for zero out the COVID in, in a human society. It’s very similar. They also organized, uh, different, uh, teams at different government levels. And they’re also emphasizing, uh, the local, uh, government official needs to be responsible for the epidemic.

Speaker 2:

And they also emphasize that, um, uh, need a big data to help control the disease outbreak situation and the emphasizing the great lowment, right? So for just like you growing cattles, right in different Greece, different regions, uh, in, even in the same animal farm, you can have different grids. If that particular grease has a disease outbreak, you can take care of that. Great particularly, right. And, and similarly they’re using the same ideas in society too. So any cities, any particular district have a outbreak, they can transfer, you know, 2000 people overnight to a isolation facility. This is almost exactly like treating animals, right? If you identify a cage, a grid of animals, whether it’s poetry, pigs have a potential outbreak, and you can quickly move all these to a, a particular location, isolate them then. And if the worst case, you know, is a large scale cooling, whether it’s killed in the poetry or, or the pigs, right?

Speaker 2:

So it happens a lot in China, especially, you know, China has so many different, uh, uh, like, uh, birds, loose situations, outbreak, or, or a SW fever like African SW fevers for the mouse disease outbreak in China, in animal facilities, right? So Chinese come very familiar with this animal, uh, control, uh, measures. And now basically they push this, uh, concept and, uh, measures into the animal, into the human society. Like, so you basically can see the Chinese don’t care about whether, uh, the human being has their own self consciousness. They have their own organization capabilities, right? People can organize, uh, self-help within the community, but Chinese government do not want any of these happen. It’s treat like animal. You are a potential host for infectious disease. You just like an animal, right? So the government have all the rights to deal with you. They can order you to, to a isolation quarantine place overnight, without any preparedness, without any further, like, uh, earlier advance, no notice, right?

Speaker 2:

Just like the sea lockdown, just within few hours, a city of 13 million people can be pushed into a lockdown, a very hard lockdown and lay down even more extreme. People are not forbidden and people are not allowed it to go to the street to purchase their own, uh, groceries, all these basic, right? So it’s very, very extreme. It’s treat like animal. So anytime I want to wipe out, or, uh, you can say the government war zero or fixed disease, they can also use these very, very hard tactics to push people into a quarantine place. So they can say, well, now we’re building a facility for 5,000 people, quarantine, a special place to, um, like a concentration came to lock on people and whether they are enough, uh, medical support for support logistic support for such a, a temporary facility, the government say, we deal with those issues later. And that’s why now in C young city, you can see so many people, uh, cry out on their social medias. Uh, talk about, we are hungry. We are start, right, because the government promised food, but it’s not there.

Speaker 1:

Yeah. I believe what you described is, uh, what they call, uh, you know, the societal COVID zero policy, and this is different from the previous one that they implemented, which is a absolute zero out policy. So this societal policy basically means that, uh, they quarantine all those who had close contact with the infected people, therefore in the future, any new case will be from those who were, uh, quarantined, but in the regular communities, in the big cities, they will reach COVID zero. So I have a, a few questions. How do you compare new policy, uh, with the old one and, uh, does the new policy, the societal COVID zero policy work.

Speaker 2:

Okay. So first let’s get, what’s the old policy. You talk about the absolute, uh, zero out policy. So actually, um, later in the year of 2021, a lot of the Chinese, uh, officials, media, uh, using the, uh, term, they call it dynamic zero because they know even for absolutely zero out policy that the, the central come and defined is very hard to implement. So you see China, uh, throughout 2021, so many different outbreak in different cities, and so many different cities. Right? I have outbreak, even though the government’s, uh, official data, always a very small number in dozen, sometimes, uh, cases in, in the big city. Uh, but it never totally crunch out. So the go, no, very clearly it’s impossible to do absolutely zero. So later in 2021, they started to use the term more about dynamic zero. That means, uh, for a city you can, uh, for a period of time, it can be zero out, right.

Speaker 2:

It’s dynamic. So it’s kind of like, um, if I gave , uh, uh, a scenario, just like you, you dealing with, uh, a trash, right? If you move your trash to your neighbors, your, your own home is temporary. Uh, trash is zero out, but the next day, if the neighbor moved the trash back to you, he is zero. And then you have new cases. So, so this is a dynamic zero, and these also still doesn’t work out. Uh, and especially in the sea installation, they, they clearly know, uh, for such a big city, certain many people, how do you move those cases away? Right. So, and especially when it has already have community transmissions, you have more cases in, in Shion. So in this way, so they create a new term cause societal zero up. So basically that means if I just, uh, store the trash in other people’s home permanently, then my home is always zero that’s societal zero up.

Speaker 2:

So you are not coming. Those people being quarantined as my, uh, Shean people, my own residents, basically. Right? So those problem can be dealed at different county level, city level, smaller city level, uh, not in a big city like C young. So that means societal zero up. So it it’s, it’s a ridiculous policy. And actually the term, the, when they create a term, it means they’re absolutely zero or dynamic zero policy doesn’t work. So they, uh, the, the local official government, uh, have to create this term in order to meet the high demand from the central government. Cause the central government want them to, to zero in four days. So by Inan all the public health official, including the CCP leaders in the local level, they understand this is impossible, mission impossible. So how do they deal with the central pressure? So they created this. So societal zero and move, you know, things of thousands of Shean people to other, uh, neighborhood, uh, counties nearby suburban areas. So in this way, they basically try to, um, please the central government. So this is a, how ridiculous still is this?

Speaker 1:

Yeah. I mean, we know what the CCP is doing, but let’s escape them. The benefit of the adult. Mm-hmm me. I mean, if they have any reason to, you know, the, the, uh, the right reason to do this is because they think if we quarantine all those dangerous people, they’re not infected yet, but the, you know, potential COVID, uh, virus carriers. If we quarantine them into one place, then it’s easier to these dangerous people. And then the rest of the community is clean. So our effort will be more directed, more focused and easier. What do you think?

Speaker 2:

Okay. Yeah, from the surface, of course, this rationale, it makes sense, but the key is how you implement it. You can currently a lot of people, but the key is that you need to think comprehensively, uh, how to support people, uh, both logistically medically, you know, uh, even mentally how you support large amount of people, uh, in, in isolation, quarantine situation. And how do you ensure people have, uh, some, uh, uh, like comorbidity, uh, disease, how do you help them overcome this kind of situation? Right? So you, you won to suddenly announce, uh, a lockdown in, in a few hours and not in the last, such a scale. So how do you, uh, prevent secondary disaster? This is always one of the top issues where you’re dealing in public health crisis. You, you have to avoid people being, uh, injured, uh, physically, mentally, uh, damaged because of the, uh, quarantine policy or isolation procedures, right? So it should be a human process, but the Chinese government doesn’t care about that. That’s why I said, uh, it is not exactly treating people as human beings.

Speaker 1:

Yeah. I have another question. This people dangerous people might be infected if they, if you put them together, wouldn’t the chances of them cross. In fact, each other be, be bigger and they could be, you know, the center of the spreading of the virus.

Speaker 2:

Yes. That’s why I said quarantine is not a simple thing, uh, of isolation, facilities and quarantine facilities, you need to, uh, especially build, right. Even in the past, even if you remember in, in Wuhan, when they build a fun time hospitals, that the temporary hospitals hosting thousands of people at a time, the Chinese C still talk about how a advanced facility is, right? All kinds of air filter system, how to, how to mobilize medical to support. But now in the year, 2022, there’s no such issues. As so, as you push people to a, a temporary quarantine location, as long as, as you do in the societal zero off the local officials feel happy about it. I deal with my problem already, right? So this is very different. And that’s why I said, uh, it is not the, uh, simple procedures to quarantine, large amount of people. That’s why in the, in the past history, governments are very helpful to implement any of these kind of policy to put large amount people into according facility. It definitely will create high potential across contamination, cross infections, higher rate of transmission, of the same infectious disease. And it is very bad situation. Yeah, yeah.

Speaker 1:

If that happens. So what do you think China would do?

Speaker 2:

That’s why I’m really worried about what will be the next step. So if we think about how people handling animal disease outbreak, right, the worst case is, is, uh, mask cooling, right? So if you, for example, if you have H seven and nine outbreak in, in the poetry, in the chicken, uh, the, the breeder can decide, I, I will kill maybe a hundred thousand, uh, chickens, birds, right? So, and then if there’s a, uh, for example, uh, African swine fever outbreak in your pigs, uh, populations, you can decide, I kill 50,000. So that’s cooling. Of course, when you massive killing a lot of people, you will temporarily block the disease transmission. And this part, this kind of measure Chinese gum is very familiar with. And maybe he’s a bad Oman. You know, the Chinese CDCs director, golf food, he’s a veterinarian. He’s not a medical doctor, the veterinarian, right?

Speaker 2:

So the Chinese government can always treating, okay, these population of people, their potential, uh, host for a big infectious disease, whether they’re close content or they’re the close content or close contact, uh, they’re just a block of people. These are people D people let me quarantine them. Um, whether they can survive these kind of isolation, I, they don’t care at this moment. So that’s why I really worry that the secondary disaster due to these very heart attack, uh, isolation procedures will kill many people, many people starving to death, or they have other disease, uh, that they varying at the same time. Right? Mobility issue will be very high. Yeah. So this is very, very in human process and no government should follow Chinese governments. Uh, uh, this kind of example, and, and I believe the Chinese government tried to, uh, push this idea to other part of world saying, you see, we, we do a very effective way in controlling these disease. And they even bring much more Chinese people to believe that your sacrifice is important for the whole country. Right? So they, they have a very successful in brainwashing people and many people as science, they not starving. They don’t think, uh, there this people in Shong in, in quarantine, what your sympathy. So that’s a very best situ

Speaker 1:

And this new wave Shion is mentally, uh, the Delta variant and, uh, black variant hasn’t reached China. Will it reach China eventually? And if China still uses the COVID zero policy on , what do you think will happen?

Speaker 2:

I actually dunno, uh, whether has been spread out in China or not, uh, there were cause talk about army, uh, cases being identified in China, even though our very small numbers, but we don’t know what’s the true situ the governments, uh, the public, uh, what’s causing the outbreak in, uh, data variants, but we didn’t see enough, uh, data regarding how many people were, uh, hospitalized. How many people having severe disease, uh, does the whole pattern showing, uh, similar pattern to the data outbreak other countries, or this is actually more similar to outbreak. Uh, we, we don’t know the government didn’t provide this information. None of the hospitals treating the COVID patients, but allowed it to give the data to the public. So how do you know what’s the true causes, the outbreak in China? So I actually suspected with the very, very powerful transmission rate from Omni crumbs Omni probably already spread out in certain regions in China.

Speaker 2:

And that’s why the, the, the Shean, or, or provinces the public health officers, the local CP leader were so scared about this way. And they use this extreme tactic. They may not just tell the public now it’s and they don’t care that Omni, maybe right now doesn’t cause, uh, very severe disease compared to data can right now basically showing, uh, less trend to, to have severe disease globally in different regions, whether in South Africa or in UK or in United States, the Chinese government don’t care about it for the local Chinese official, because the central government’s order is to zero out. Uh the, the COVID right. So as long as they be in testing, uh, plastic, uh, on this nuclear acid test, the local official have to be responsible for this, uh, community outbreak, whether it’s data or . So they just use the same extreme measures, uh, to, to wipe out, try to wipe out these, uh, numbers. I say numbers, right? Because they’re not really treating the disease, not treating the people they’re just cared about the number.

Speaker 1:

Yeah. I’ve seen the Chinese media reports, uh, saying that this round, this wave is, uh, the Delta variant. Let’s just say that report is, uh, accurate, but if there are one cycle behind the international epidemic cycle, now that Delta and everybody else’s , uh, what I mean, does that have an impact? I mean,

Speaker 2:

Well, I, I think, uh, it’s almost impossible. China can be a, a unique island, uh, for Omni ground. Uh, the way the army spread is so fast. I know in China, uh, zero campaign can block . I don’t think China stay any chance for that.

Speaker 1:

Okay. So if Amran riches, China, uh, if they still apply this zero up policy, they will be in big trouble

Speaker 2:

Even. Oh, definitely. They’re already in. Yeah, definitely. I think they’re already in trouble in dealing with data with army crimes and it will be very much faster, especially if you put, you know, thousands of people in a temporary, uh, quarantine places like a garage, so many people will be affected. And actually I see some social media posts talk about, uh, people who, uh, who actually want to be isolated. The, the hospital refused to accept him. And then eight members from his family actually all got infected. Yeah. So ridiculous. Extreme examples like the in Shean. So anyway, I don’t think the Chinese can contain Amran. No countries can contain Amran. Nobody believe the human being can contain Armyn spreading right now. Uh, so I don’t think Chinese government can, uh, stay any chance to see, uh, to successfully zero army.

Speaker 1:

Hmm. But the Chinese leader, she Jean at at least for now, he is still insisting that China should apply this zero out policy and anybody who is opposing it, uh, this policy, he gets very angry with that person. So, I mean, how do you think this zero out policy play out in China in the future? Do you think they will stick to it to the end?

Speaker 2:

You, yeah, I think, uh, uh, yes, I think will stick out to his policies because any change of the policy will, uh, threaten his, uh, his positions and in the critical year, uh, reelection year, right. We would let’s call it reelection simply. But anyway, he, I don’t think he wanted change the policies, but at the same time, maybe the Chinese gun will be lucky because even a lot of people got infected with army crimes because many people are not showing severe disease. The Chinese government can always say, oh, see, no, no many people die and they they’ve been successful. Contain a disease. Chinese go can always, uh, tell a good story to the public so that people still believing the Chinese government did very good, uh, very people being sacrificing sea lockdown. What read on the internet, just a small, uh, sporadic situations. Um, it’s not as systematic happening.

Speaker 2:

Uh, people were being treated nicely. The, the government can do all these, uh, usage after this, uh, high lockdown. And right now they’re probably very worried about the, the winter Olympic in Beijing. That’s why Beijing implementing, uh, 56 days, uh, quarantine for any inbound travelers. So this is very extreme, right? No, no scientific reason for 56 days, uh, quarantine, but basically tell the world the Beijing one to who, uh, currenting you, the whole period, uh, until the winter is over. So basically that’s how they contain the distillation. And so the Chinese will tell, uh, Chinese people a good story. We have successfully how our Olympic you see, you know, we contain the situation. We don’t have, uh, maybe S going factory. They can always tell this kind of story to people. And then boosting, uh, the CCPs, the image to, to people, to the world saying they are the very successful example, even though the Chinese society suffer a lot and they try to further prove the dictatorship Soarian style, the Chinese government represents actually have a better advantage than the democratic system. That’s their whole EU they’re already preparing. And, and then they will carry out this campaign exactly in this way. So if

Speaker 1:

You were the guy who is, uh, you know, uh, who is, uh, overseeing China’s, uh, uh, pandemic control, uh, what do you think you would do?

Speaker 2:

I think, um, with a normal human, uh, thinking, you need to think about how to help people overcome this disease in a rational way. And if you see, uh, the globally, uh, the, all the scientific evidence, somatic evidence showing the, the spread of virus is so strong and such a strong IME innovation. So many people cannot avoid, uh, being infected by this wave of . Then you need to think about how human society can Cozi with the virus. How do you, uh, avoid hospital system, the overloaded, and then how do you quickly, uh, using different other, uh, maybe drugs to help people reduce their symptoms, all these kind of additional measure, or even other non pharmaceutical intervention measures that you can implement to support society. And how do you reduce, uh, the, the mental stress that people have in this kind of, uh, pandemics period. These are all very challenging task, very important tasks, and you can all do it in a very humane ways. And, uh, I think, uh, the key issues, whether you have a human heart, have a human mind or not, and I don’t think the Chinese government doing it in a human way, in a human way.

Speaker 1:

Great. Well, Sean, these are all my questions. Do you have anything else to add?

Speaker 2:

Well, I, I think, uh, let’s say for me right now, it’s really, really thank you for inviting me to, uh, have a comment on this situation in Cun.

Speaker 1:

Okay. Thank you, Sean.

Speaker 2:

Thank you very much.

Speaker 1:

Okay.

Speaker 2:

Good. All right. Good. Thank you. Thank you. All right. Okay. Bye.