Should the West Prepare an Off-ramp to End the War?

Harlan Ullman:
We’re deadlocked.

The American policy is not to negotiate, Putin has said no to negotiations. And so the American expectation is that ultimately the battlefield will cause so much Russian bled to be let, that Putin will have no option except to make concessions and negotiate. I don’t think that’s a good idea.

Simone Gao:

On September 30, in a speech on celebrating the four states merged into the Russian federation after the so-called referendum. Putin hinted at a nuclear attack.


In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.

Simone Gao:
it’s one thing that, uh, you know, whether Putin’s threats are real. It’s another thing whether Putin thinks his, uh, threats could make a difference.

Harlan Ullman:

Putin understands shock and awe, the threat of nuclear weapons, certainly over a cold winter when combined with energy shortages in Europe, are gonna be taken quite seriously.

Simone Gao:

The world is on edge over Putin’s nuclear threat. Could he really do it? Is there still an offramp to end the war? I spoke with Harlan Ullman, former naval officer, author of multiple books, and Senior Advisor of the Atlantic Council about this and more.

I am Simone Gao, and you are watching Zooming In.

Simone Gao:
Thank you, Mr. Ullman for joining Zooming In today.

Harlan Ullman:
I’m delighted to be with you.

Simone Gao:
Okay. Congratulations on your new book. And I would like to discuss with you on that book a little bit later. But first I wanna discuss the war over Ukraine. is that okay with you?

Harlan Ullman:
Of course.

Simone Gao:
Okay. So last week, Putin gave a long speech accepting the four states into the Russian Federation after the so-called referendum. In that speech, Putin made the nuclear threat. But other than that part, what is your overall impression of that speech? And Putin’s psychological state right now.

Harlan Ullman:
In my book, which will get to the Fifth Horseman and the New Man, I have three chapters on Vladimir Putin and China’s president Xi Jinping. You need to read that speech of annexation very carefully. He used the nuclear reference to Hiroshima, but he also used the reference to Dresden, in which that German city was obliterated by a combination of US and British bombers using conventional weapons. I think the point he was alluding to is that the West was evil and destructive rather than the threat of nuclear weapons. However, the fact of the matter is, imagine a worst case for President Putin. Imagine the call up of 300,000 reservists doesn’t work. Suppose the Ukrainian military continues its advance in the Northeast, around and in the South against Kherson, and the Russian military is forced to retreat. And indeed, people are afraid that it might even break.

Harlan Ullman:
What does Putin do? So I think that we need to take the nuclear threat seriously, but I think it’s very, very unlikely because I do not think the nuclear threat is something that would be to Putin’s advantage. But when you’re talking about nuclear weapons, there’s no such thing as a small nuclear weapon. One kilo ton, which is about 1/20 of the size of the bombs that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is worth a thousand tons of TNT, a thousand tons, and a megaton, which is an H-bomb, a hydrogen bomb, is a million tons of TNT. These are extraordinarily powerful weapons. And so I think if Putin were to use nuclear weapons, I don’t think he’d do it to obliterate Kyiv, because that would destroy the state. And if he did use them, I think that the United States and the West have the capability through conventional weapons, basically missiles and standoff attack to destroy the Russian army in Ukraine.

Harlan Ullman:
And make no mistake, we would devastate it, and it would no longer be a fighting force. What’s interesting is that later this month of October celebrates the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was arguably the most dangerous nuclear standoff during the Cold War. What happened was that when John Kennedy was elected president, he had run on a promise to rebuild America’s defense thinking there was a huge missile gap. There was a missile gap, but the Russians, the Soviets, were miles and miles behind. They had virtually no strategic weapons. And so Kennedy began this arms build up at the same time that Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union, had started two years before a huge defense build down. So in many ways, Khrushchev was forced to respond because the build down meant that he could transfer scarce rubles to the Soviet civil side of the budget and improve people’s lives, putting short range nuclear weapons into Cuba really out-flanked America’s strategic advantage.

Harlan Ullman:
But of course, as we know, the Americans found out, and of course, because of geography, Cuba being only 90 miles off the Florida coast, and the fact that we had an overwhelming strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, Khrushchev was forced to withdraw. I make that analogy because President Kennedy did two things that were very sensible. He formed an excom, an executive committee of outside experts to advise him, and he had excellent communications directly with Nikita Khrushchev, in part through Anatoly Dobrynin, who was a well respected Soviet ambassador in Moscow. Now, I make those two points because President Biden has not convened an executive committee. I’m not sure whether he has enough people advising him who know Putin well enough and are providing him all the advice he needs. And communications with Russia do not seem to be very good. Now, where are we?

Harlan Ullman:
We’re deadlocked. The American policy is not to negotiate, to give Ukraine enough weapons for them to defend themselves without escalating the war. As I said, no to negotiations, Putin has said no to negotiations. And so the American expectation is that ultimately the battlefield will cause so much Russian blood to be let, that Putin will have no option except to make concessions and negotiate. I don’t think that’s a good idea. I think there should be lines of diplomacy that are open to begin to discuss how this can end. But right now, we’re deadlocked, Ukrainians and the Americans aren’t gonna give in. The Russians aren’t gonna give in. Nuclear weapons have been threatened. The war is escalating, and there’s no apparent off threat. And then you overlay that with other crises over Taiwan, what’s happening in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf, the fact that the OPEC and Russia are gonna cut back on oil inflation and elections in the United States.

Harlan Ullman:
And we have far too many crises and potential crises that are ongoing right now. So this is a very perilous time. And indeed, that’s why I hope that Mr. Biden will solicit opinion beyond his own people inside the government and establish some kind of diplomatic inroads, possibly through China or India or Turkey or France with Russia. So we can begin to see how we can put an end to this conflict in which thousands of people are dying. Ukraine is being destroyed, and this is a war at this stage that has no positive outcome, at least as far as most people can see.

Simone Gao:
Let’s talk about Putin’s off front a little bit later. You know, first, former CIA director General David Petraeus said yesterday that there is virtually nothing that Russia can do that can make a difference. He also said that the Russians do not appear to be all that prepared for some kind of nuclear activity, the preparations you have to take before you do that, otherwise your own soldiers would be vulnerable. So my question is, you know, first of all, do you agree with him? Do you think Putin’s threats are real? And also, it’s one thing whether Putin’s threats are real. It’s another thing whether Putin thinks his threats could make a difference.

Harlan Ullman:
I agree. General Petraeus has got a, he’s a terrific general, he’s a great strategist, he’s a brilliant guy. He’s also a good friend of mine, and I agree with him. Imagine if the incompetence that the Russian military has shown persist in their nuclear weapons. I mean, that’s really frightening. And the Russian army has got absolutely no experience in a nuclear battlefield. So even if the order were to be given, and there are several lines of chains of command, it’s not just Putin. There are at least two ranks of generals that he’s gotta go through. I’m not sure how competent the Russians would be in using them, and they have no idea about how to operate in a nuclear battlefield. So those are constraints. But having said that, Putin understands shock and awe, as you may know, that I was the original author of Shock and Awe, and the threat of nuclear weapons, certainly over a cold winter when combined with energy shortages in Europe, are gonna be taken quite seriously, certainly by the Alliance. So at this stage, I think he views this as a psychological weapon to affect will and perception. I think it’s unlikely that nuclear weapons will be used, but I didn’t think Putin would be stupid enough to invade Ukraine. And so we’ve gotta take that seriously and prepare for it. But you’re right, and General Petraeus is right. The Russian army has no preparations for using these weapons, and it could turn out to be a huge disaster for them if indeed they did.

Simone Gao:
Hmm. Okay. So if this threats would not be realized in the end, should the West take it seriously?

Harlan Ullman:
Absolutely, absolutely. You need to take these threats seriously, because supposing he uses it, even if it was a 5 or 10% chance. And I think we’ve done that. I’m sure that the Pentagon has done lots of war gaming. I’m sure that when National Security advisor, Jake Sullivan said the consequences would be catastrophic, I’m sure the Russians know that we would eliminate basically most of their military forces in Ukraine and certainly in Crimea and sink the Black Sea Fleet. And we can do that. He can’t. We can. So I think that in itself will be a real constraint to what Russia could do. But imagine a worse case. Imagine this is now Russia 1917, the protests get out of hand. People are fleeing the draft. He’s got a really chaotic situation. The Army is losing badly. Is he gonna surrender? Surrender is gonna mean perhaps giving up his leadership role in a potentially bloody coup. So given the fact that they’ve got some 2000 so-called theater or tactical nuclear weapons, you have to leave open that option, even though it’s very, very unlikely it would be used. And I think we’ve done that. I think we’re prepared the best we can, and I think that alone should be, as I said, a sufficient way to prevent and constrain Putin from considering their use.

Simone Gao:
Hmm. Okay. So do you think Putin is now backed into a corner? Other than the nuclear weapons, does he have any other options?

A World Stood up to Beijing, A Conversation with Miles Yu | Zooming in with Simone Gao

Simone Gao: The war in Ukraine has brought changes to the world.

Do you think it has changed the balance of power and strategic Alliance of the major powers in the world so far?

Miles Yu: NATO is no longer considering itself, a purely regional and European defense path. It actually considers peace and stability in the Indo Pacific part of its new mission as well.

Simone Gao: But, has Xi Jinping heeded the warning?

Miles Yu: I don’t think Xi Jinping is even teachable of any lessons.

Simone Gao: Dr. Miles Yu, former Secretary of State Mike Pomeo’s top China advisor, nevertheless, suggests that Xi learns two things.

Miles Yu: Bullying a small country will never work, the United States and its allies are determined to defend Taiwan.

Simone Gao: And his words to Taiwan is:

Miles Yu: Never give in to threat and bullying.

Simone Gao: Dr. Yu, thank you so much for joining Zooming In today.

Miles Yu: Thank you for inviting me. I’m glad to be here with you again.

Simone Gao: Okay. So I know a new China Center was just formed at the Hudson Institute last month, and you are the director of it. Can you tell us a bit more about this center? Why was it formed? What is it going to do and how is it going to be different from other China-related think-tanks in DC?

Miles Yu: Let me answer your last question. First, the China Center at the Hudson Institute is unlike other think-tank centers in Washington. Uh, in that it is a product of a unique moment in US history when America’s attitude, understanding and resolve to face a formidable challenge that is the Chinese party has reached an unprecedented national consensus. Political forces from all sides, left, center and right, have all agreed on this historical shift, which is almost 180 degrees of our national policy toward communist China.

The cross of this unprecedented national consensus on China is the end of a misguided area of engagement and appeasement to the CCP and the beginning of a national awakening to the intention, capabilities and opportunities of the Chinese communist party. Uh, the party has used different ways to upend the free and democratic global system and to replace it with the autocratic model of governance led by the Marxist-Leninist Chinese Communist party, a party that has been to be frank, enabled and empowered by our decades of naive engagement and unprincipled appeasement.

So, the central mission of the China Center at Hudson is therefore to promote and preserve this historic national consensus on China to prevent it from becoming another victim of partisanship. Uh, so another unique feature of Hudson’s China Center is that many of my colleagues associated with the center are the veterans of the revolutionary change of our China policy during the Trump administration, secretary of state Mike Pompeo, for example, works with us in the capacity of the China central chairman of the advisory board.

I myself was deeply involved in that China policy revolution during the Trump administration. We will do our best to ensure a policy continuity, help the current and future American administrations, no matter which party it may be, with our expertise, experiences, and recommendations, so that American democracy will withstand the CCPs challenge. And we will win the strategic competition for freedom, human rights and world law.

Simone Gao: (03:06)
Right, right. Uh, talking about this historic moment in the US-China relations, one of the geopolitical events that has a major impact on China is the Russo-Ukrainian war. So what is your overall assessment of the war? Was it avoidable in your opinion? And, uh, do you think it has changed the balance of power and strategic alliance of the major powers in the world so far?

Miles Yu: I think all wars are weighed with certain kind of ideas behind it. I think that Russia has long held a dangerous idea. And so that idea has not really been refuted sufficiently. Therefore I see the war coming, uh, sort of in a expected. Now what is the idea? Well, Russia war against Ukraine is completely unjustified. It reflects an antiquated imperialistic Russian mentality that all peoples of other sovereign nations who may have shared historical ethnic, or even linguistic ties with Russian culture should be ruled by the Moscow civilization state called Russia.

So this justification for agression in Ukraine is very dangerous and it is exactly what the Chinese Communist Party is advocating for in the context of Taiwan. Russia and the CCP share exactly the same absurd warmongering logic, uh, both Moscow and Beijing are saying that history, ethnicity and a language should determine political sovereignty and territorial belonging, but not political independence, popular elections and international law.

So this Chinese and Russian thinking must be stopped for the sake of world peace and international stability. Now, you asked me another aspect of the war that is, uh, what does it mean? Well, the war in Ukraine itself has rendered profound lessons to all, both aggressors and aggressed. To the aggressors. It has really become a perfect case of global rallying, uh, of tremendous moral and material support for Ukraine and Taiwan against the naked threats of invasion and subjugation. Uh, just as a very familiar Chinese saying goes, “a just cause attracts great support and unjust one finds little”.

Because of this Russian-Chinese joint venture of aggression, these two countries are extremely isolated, morally, internationally, and China is a warrant that if it does the copycat act by invading Taiwan, China will be sanctioned, boycotted, and resisted severely and debilitatingly. So I would say, you know, uh, another important consequence of the war in Ukraine is that it has really taught the victimized and threatened small countries like Taiwan, that they must have their own indigenously, strong national defense forces, but most importantly, never give in to threat and bullying.

Only when a nation shows its resolve and tenacity for self defense can great international military support, make any difference. With strong self defense and great military assistance from allies, Taiwan will prevail.

So I think, you know, in the end freedom and democracy will win. But you asked me, excuse me, you asked me also about whether the war in Ukraine has changed global balance of power. My answer is not really, despite the Russia’s broad war in Ukraine. I think the international consensus that the CCP is a world’s number one threat still remains. Not only that, I think that because of the war in Ukraine, global major power players have even deepened, their existing strategic perspective by viewing the CCP as even more dangerous because of its closer and closer relationship with Russia, not just in Europe, but more importantly in the Indo-Pacific as well.

Uh, well I think this is happening because the world knows that Russia is kind of less advanced economically and technologically than the CCP. Let me just make this right clear. China’s economy is a more than 10 times bigger than Russia’s.

It has much more advanced asymmetrical weapon platforms in emerging new frontier of modern warfare. So that’s why we have seen that for the first time a global multilateral collective defense ground Alliance is slowly but steadily taking shape, with China and Russia at the center of its preoccupation. For example, NATO is no longer considering itself, a purely regional and European defense pact.

It actually considers peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific part of its new mission as well. And this is pretty amazing. You can see that in a recently concluded NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, for example, for the first time ever leaders of key Indo-Pacific democracies, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are invited to take part in, and the NATOs 2022 strategic council specifically mentioned this PRC as one of its strategic security priorities. And that is pretty amazing. So that’s why I say the war in Ukraine has not really changed global power balance and China, not Russia, continues to be world’s biggest security threat.

Simone Gao: Hmm. In your early part of the answer, you talked about whether the Taiwanese people are ready for a possible CCP aggression. I wanna talk about that a little bit more later, but for now I have another question, you know, regarding the war, some analysts say from now to winter is a critical time for how the world would turn out. America and Europe should provide enough heavy weapons to Ukraine for them to launch an offensive, to turn the dynamics of the battlefield around.

Otherwise when winter kicks in, the ban on Russian energy will put Europe in a very difficult situation, which might undermine our result to keep supporting Ukraine and keep the sanctions in place. However, America and Europe are not determined. I mean, those two, those analysts, uh, America and Europe are not determined to let Ukraine win before winter. They’re not providing enough heavy weapons. What is your opinion on this?

Miles Yu: Well, I think, you know, I might challenge the sort of the premises of some of your questions a little bit, but, uh, let me just try to answer this way. Uh, I think European countries are realizing the importance of energy independence more and more. They’re trying not to be blackmailed by Russia for energy supply. However, I do not believe Russia is a number one factor in Europe’s energy crisis. It is a crisis.

It is a problem, but it’s not the biggest one. I think the real problem with Europe’s energy crisis is extreme left-wing woke politics. Germany, for example, is most vulnerable to Russia’s energy blackmail. That’s because German leaders for many years have purposefully neglected its energy independence, gone woke with over-reliance, unlimited renewable energy sources, basically solar and wind, you know, solar and wind can never supply enough to meet Germany’s national energy demand.

So Germany has to rely on Russia. However, you know, you don’t hear much about the French worrying about their winter’s energy shortage. That’s because about 85% of France energy comes out of its own nuclear power plants. In other words, France has energy independence, therefore making France far less susceptible to Russia’s energy blackmail, but nuclear power plant is considered not politically correct in Germany and the Germans are now in trouble, but I think they should really blame themselves more, not just the Russians.

About energy shortage and the war in Ukraine, I think the winter harshness is a double-edged sword for both sides of the war. It might be tough for the Ukrainians and its allies in Europe, but it may even be a bigger problem for the Russians. Uh, let me, let’s just say this way. If the Russians in good weather couldn’t win the war, how could we expect them to do better in harsh winter conditions, with the Europe’s legendary winter muddiness and the snowy mess, Russian tanks, armored vehicles and soldiers may well be further and further stopped, becoming Ukrainian’s sitting ducks for target practice.

Simone Gao: That’s interesting. You know, I wanna ask you a couple more question on that, but let’s just go to the biggest question. I mean, this has a lot to do with Xi Jinping what do you think Xi Jinping has learned from this war so far?

Miles Yu: Well, personally, I don’t think Xi Jinping is even teachable of any lessons, but if I were Xi Jinping, I would be aware of the following: Number one, bullying a small country will never work, as the small will gain more inner strength and external support becoming much stronger and more lethal in the end. Number two, the United States and its allies are determined to defend Taiwan, especially after Puutin’s aggression in Ukraine, because the world has realized once an act of aggression started, a chain of aggression may follow, and Taiwan should not be allowed to be the first link of world of aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Number three, there are great limits in modern warfare because there are many variables. China may look strong, but it has great weaknesses and vulnerabilities too. So a war of aggression against Taiwan may not really be that easy to win. So you ask how the war impacts Taiwan’s strategies. I think the biggest impact is that the previously rampant defeatism and capitulationism has been further discredited in Taiwan, the free and sovereign people of Taiwan are now more united. And the freedom’s cause has indeed formed a united front in Taiwan’s defense.

Simone Gao: You answered this question. Uh, so I was gonna ask you, but I’m glad you already answered. So you think this war has strengthened Taiwan’s defense strategies?

Miles Yu: Yes.

Simone Gao: Okay. So do you think the Taiwanese people are mentally and physically prepared for a potential military aggression by the CCP now?

Miles Yu: More so than ever.

Simone Gao: Okay. Than ever, but are they prepared enough if the CCP is going to launch an aggression right now, are they ready?

Miles Yu: Well, it’s very hard to put simplistic yes or no answer, because the wars are basically kind of unpredictable, but I see Taiwanese people are more and more together. They have gained a much broader consensus on the survival of the nation, what’s really at stake. And most importantly, I think Taiwanese people are realizing more and more that they will get much, much more support from the international community.

That’s because, as I said earlier, many people, particularly countries around China, you can see Japan, Australia, you know, even Vietnam, many people view the China threat against Taiwan is just the beginning of the China aggression. If China takes Taiwan, who knows might be next, the South China Sea, China might fight a war with Vietnam, with India. So this is the reason why Taiwan’s cause has gained so much more support. Most of them sort of passively, but some of the leaders in the China’s periphery actually have said openly, they will come to Taiwan’s defense in the case of the war.

Simone Gao: Yeah. Okay. Next question. I wanna talk about the CCPs 20th National Congress. You know, the party’s conclave is going to happen in October this year, and there’s a lot of a speculations on whether Xi Jinping will get a third term and whether China’s reform-oriented forces represented by premier Li Keqiang would chip away some of Xi Jinping’s power. So what do you make of the top power struggle politics in China right now?

Miles Yu: Well, you use a very good word, conclave, which implies secrecy and furtiveness. I mean, that’s exactly what the Chinese Communist Party politics is all about. It’s very, very undemocratic, it’s very non-transparent. You asked me the question the result, Li Keqiang up or down, Xi Jinping in or out. You know what, I don’t know and I don’t care. What’s going on inside the Byzantine labyrinth of CCP power struggle, inside the ruling elite should never be the Chinese people’s top preoccupation. I know the CCP has exerted an iron group over the Chinese people, but if the Chinese people do not play into the CCPs game and consider the CCP intellectually irrelevant, then we will see real progress in China.

To me personally, whether Xi Jinping stays or gets out, whether Li Keqiang gets in or out, it doesn’t really matter. They are all communist, dedicated to one and only objective, that is to preserve the longevity of the CCP dictatorship. We should also keep in mind, even the most reform minded, Chinese communist leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping would never hesitate for a split second in ordering the massacre of the Chinese people, just as what happened in 1989 Tiananmen Square. So the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre should have waken up the Chinese people to this simple fact: for the CCP to prolong, the Chinese people must suffer and die. There’s no other arrangements.

Simone Gao: I know you came to America. I don’t know when, but you had experienced or heard. I mean, I know you had a deep memory and a lot of thinking regarding the Tiananmen Massacre happened in 1989. Can you just tell me a little bit, whether, I mean, before and after, like how your thoughts on China have changed because of the event?

Miles Yu: I think, you know, many people who experienced the 1989 momentous events in Tiananmen and elsewhere, like the Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, all share something in common. And that common experience is this: that is, a communist rules all have something similar. That is, they rule people with fear. They instill tremendous fear to its people. So people were afraid of doing this and doing that. They were afraid ofspeaking up.

So the true meaning of Tiananmen movement is that for seven weeks people of China, center in Tinanmen square were more or less free of fear instilled by the Chinese Communist Party, those were the freest seven weeks in the history of a Chinese communist regime. So I think that’s why even though it’s a short-lived seven weeks of glory, but that seven weeks gave a lot of people freedom and an individual who tests freedom, no matter how briefly, would never be the same person again.

Miles Yu: That’s why Tiananmen is a momentous moment, not just for any particular individuals who actually participated in that, but also is a moment of awakening to a generation of people, even to generations to follow. And that’s also why the Chinese Communist Party has done its utmost best to wipe out any memory, any commemoration of the Tiananmen movement. And that’s tragedy. Our job as an individual citizen of the world is to keep the memory alive and to understand and appreciate the true meaning of the Tiananmen movement of 1989. That is freedom. So I think that freedom can mean, many things to many people, but that’s my understanding.

Simone Gao: Right. And do you think China will ever regain its freedom?

Miles Yu: Oh yeah. I remember one of the most moving moments in my memory, in the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen, was the American singer, Joan Baez, she composed a very emotionally charged song. And I think the song, the lyric repeats over and over again, it says just simply that China shall be free.

Simone Gao: Okay. All right. Thank you so much. Doctor Yu, these are all my questions. Do you have anything else to add?

Miles Yu: Well, good luck with your program and thank you for having me today.

How China’s Telecoms Steal America’s Most Sensitive Information and What Needs to Be Done About It?

Simone Gao:
On July 25, CNN published an exclusive report that revealed a dramatic escalation of Chinese espionage on US soil over the past decade. The Report says Since at least 2017, federal officials have investigated Chinese land purchases near critical infrastructure, shut down a high-profile regional consulate, that is, the Chinese Consulate in Huston. The US government believed it to be a hot bed of Chinese spies and stonewalled what they saw as clear efforts to plant listening devices near sensitive military and government facilities.

The report also highlighted Huawei, China’s biggest telecommunications company that was once poised to take over the world 5G deployment until the America-led coalition stopped it. The report says the FBI uncovered Huawei  equipment atop cell towers near US military bases in the  rural Midwest. According to multiple sources familiar with the matter, the FBI determined the equipment was capable of capturing and disrupting highly restricted Defense Department communications, including those used by US Strategic Command, which oversees the country’s nuclear weapons.

It’s unclear if the intelligence community determined whether any data was actually intercepted and sent back to Beijing from these towers. Sources familiar with the issue say that from a technical standpoint, it’s incredibly difficult to prove a given package of data was stolen and sent overseas.

It is significant that this report came after Hua Wei’s 5G ambition had been shattered by the U.S. government two years ago. The defeat of Hua Wei in 5G was a great victory on the side of the free world. Many people think the threat posed by Huawei is gone. But is it really? To find out the answer, I spoke with Keith Krach, former under secretary of State for the Trump administration, who was behind the Hua Wei take down operation, about this matter and more.

Simone Gao:
Do you think Huawei still poses a significant national security threat to America right now and what should be done about it?

Keith Krach:
Absolutely, Simone, and I am sure our intelligence agencies and the Defense Department are monitoring this closely, but it should be shut down immediately. You know, Huawei is an arm of the Chinese government. They have some of the most sophisticated capabilities in the world to do all kinds of things that might not be detected. And obviously the information in that area is some of the most vital to our national security. We’re talking about the nuclear arsenal and it ranks absolutely near the top in terms of the kind of information the CCP wants, that information is priceless.

Simone Gao:
You are the person who executed the Huawei take-down operation and later expanded that approach to create the clean network. What are the essential facts you learnt about China’s technological aggression from that operation and what is your core strategic response to that aggression?

Keith Krach:
Well, Simone, here’s what I learned: that Huawei is the most important company to the CCP. It’s the backbone for their surveillance state. They’re the national champ in 5G. And you know, this tool is a tool that, you know, the worst of dictators could have only dreamed of, you know, they use this in Xinjiang, they use it literally everywhere. They test it out in Xinjiang, they monitor all the people in China. Now they’re exporting it like, dictator out of the box. And you know, it seemed two years ago was inevitable that the CCP’s master plan to control 5G was absolutely unstoppable. But as you pointed out, the Clean Network Alliance of Democracies ended up defeating this master plan. And, you know, the interesting thing is they’ve tried to use this everywhere and they will stop at nothing.

Keith Krach:
You know, the other big area, and Huawei has a subsidiary in this area is underwater cable, because there you can literally tap at anything. And I’ll tell you what we found out as we went around the world, building that Clean Network Alliance of Democracies, which has now formed the basis for president Biden’s internet declaration, is that nobody trusts the CCP and that’s their biggest weakness. And, you know, if you look at the information that 5G networks carry, you know, we’re not just talking about a smartphone, we’re talking about sanitation systems, utility grids, power systems, internet of things, manufacturing processes. This is vital. So, you know, we have to stay on top of this as democracies all around the world.

Simone Gao:
I understand recently you formed the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy and the Global Tech Security Commission. I believe they are the continuation of your response to China’s technological aggression. So can you tell us more of the thoughts behind these efforts?

Keith Krach:
Sure, Simone. You know, the key to securing freedom for this next generation is securing technology and tomorrow’s tech must be trusted tech and developed by a global trust network of like-minded countries, companies, and individuals who respect the rule of law, human rights, labor practices, the environment, respect for property of all kinds, and of course, respect for national sovereignty. And, you know, the objective is to develop the definitive global tech security strategy to safeguard freedom through the adoption of trusted technology, by designing a set of sector specific strategies, as well as taking an integrated approach that democracies can adopt to counter techno-authoritarianism. So three factors make up the commission’s scope uniquely, strategic in terms of countering those threats. First, the commission will focus on in-depth strategies in the 17 critical tech sectors that the White House name.

Keith Krach:
Basically the same ones that we used in the last administration just broken up a little bit differently. And the key is to integrate those into an overarching tech strategy. The second is, the scope is gonna be global and also private sector led, with commissioners from international companies and institutions. And we will represent more than a dozen countries as parts of democracies’ common efforts to compete in this emerging technology space. You know, the third thing is while previous commissions have primarily focused on analysis of the problems with recommendations limited to defensive policies, the global tech security commission will integrate offensive and defensive strategies and it will be beginning to build a global tech trust network, kind of carry on that Clean Network Alliance of Democracies, as well as defining overarching tech trust standards. And the objective is to accelerate the adoption of trusted technology,

Simone Gao:
Right. One of the strategies Global Tech Security Commission features is that the scope of the operation will be global and private sector led. Why is that? Why should the private sector instead of the government lead the effort?

Keith Krach:
So, first of all, Simone, the commission’s global tech security strategy is designed to complement recent multinational efforts that are led by governments to counter authoritarianism, such as the Indo-Pacific economic framework and the future of the internet declaration, as I talked about before. And by building a public- private coalition to promote democratic trust principles and digital trust standards and the widespread adoption trusted technology, you know, this is gonna have a really, really big impact. You know, one of the things that we’re seeing is, you know, some of the most prominent board members in the United States are demanding from their CEOs a China contingency plan, with the heightened risk of a conflict between China and Taiwan. There’s no doubt about it, that secretary Xi looks at China as, you know, it dispels his myth that he’s created that the Chinese culture cannot live in a democracy.

Keith Krach:
Nothing could be farther from the truth and Taiwan proves that. So he wants it destroyed. And so this has kind of heightened that risk, and for democracies Taiwan’s role model of freedom and a lynchpin in that area in terms of global economic security and national security. And obviously there’s semiconductor businesses the top in the world, which is the most important industry. So, you know, for corporations, if there’s a China-Taiwan conflict, then you know, this is gonna be devastating and absolutely catastrophic for the high tech industry. So, you know, these companies are putting together these contingency plans because they saw what happened when Putin invaded Ukraine. They had to pull all their operations out of Russia, cost hundreds of billions of dollars. And they were totally caught off guard and China is 10 to 20 times larger impact, more entangled.

Keith Krach:
So this is really important for boards to demand this from their CEOs because a board member’s fiduciary duty is to mitigate risk. And just like you have a plan for a cybersecurity breach, you need to have a contingency plan in case there’s that Taiwan-China conflict because if you don’t, and you don’t actually start on it right now, it’s gonna be too late by the time if it’s after the fact. And that’s why at the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue, we’re getting requests in terms of what do these contingency plans look like? So those are some of the areas we’re helping out different corporations on.

Simone Gao:
Right. The commission will also integrate offensive and defensive strategies while previous commissions have primarily focused on defensive policies. Why is there such a change?

Keith Krach:
Well, the one thing I can tell you Simone, is that the best defense is a strong offense. So, you know, if you look back at the global economic security strategy that we put together a few years ago, there were three main pillars of that. The first one was to turbo charge our economic competitiveness and innovation. The second one was safeguard strategic assets that would be looked at as defensive that first one offensive. And the third one of course, was to build a network of trusted partners. So that is absolutely critical. You know, a great example of what we’re doing offensively is the Chips Act, the Chips plus Act

Simone Gao:
On August 9, President Joe Biden signed into law a multibillion dollar bill boosting domestic semiconductor and other high-tech manufacturing sectors that US leaders fear are being dominated by rival China.

Joe Biden:
The CHIPS and Science Act supercharges our efforts to make semiconductors here in America. This increased research and development funding is going to ensure the United States leads the world in the industries of the future. From Quantum computing to artificial intelligence to advanced biotechnology, the kinds of investment that will deliver vaccines for cancer cures, for HIV, invent the next big thing that hasn’t even been imagined yet.

Simone Gao:
The Chips and Science Act includes around $52 billion to promote production of microchips.

Keith Krach:
Because this is investing and securing the semiconductor supply chain, which all kind of began with that 5G trifecta, which was the opening salvo for the clean network, where we onshore TSMC in the largest onshore in history, 12 billion dollars.

Our strategy for that and our hope was that it would do three big things. One is TSMC would bring their ecosystem of suppliers, which is absolutely huge, that indeed happened. The second is that it would spur the other semiconductor manufacturers we’re trying to get on board to invest, especially Samsung and Intel. And indeed that happened as a matter of fact, Samsung recently announced 17 billion dollars additional investment in the United States and then Intel, you know, less than a year after we did that onshoring, they announced a 20 billion investment in Arizona, and now they’re doing a 20 billion plus investment in the state of Ohio where I’m from. So this is absolutely great. The other thing that we’re hoping for and we really, our strategy was designed for, is that we would get universities to develop curriculum in semiconductor engineering and also much more work in semiconductor, R and D.

Keith Krach:
And that is happening, you know, at Purdue, my old Alma mater, we just announcedthe United States’ first master’s degree in semiconductor engineering. So there’s a lot of investments. It really spur that on. So that’s an example of the areas where we can work together. And that’s one of the reasons why, you know, we designed a thing called the TD 12 or Techno Democracy 12, where we could not only work on things like defensive things like investment screening and export controls, those kind of things, but also in terms of collaborating in terms of R and D ’cause there’s a lot of economies of scale there.

Simone Gao:
China is weaponizing big data against the West, applications such as TikTok collect massive amount of user data, analyzing them, generate content that tailored to individual users’ interest, get people addicted, and then try to influence their political views once the app becomes indispensable to them. So what is the best way to eliminate such a danger?

Keith Krach:
Well, I can tell you one thing, Simone, that, you know, TikTok as well as U.S. tech platforms are used as a propaganda tool by China and, you know, and why do they do that? They want us so dissension because there’s nothing that general secretary Xi fears more than a united United States. So to try to work both ends of the political spectrum or so discontent, that’s been their aim for a long, long time. We have plenty of evidenc in open source on that. You know, the other thing is two big key areas is transparency and reciprocity. So if you look at that great, I call it the great one way China firewall, where all the data comes in for their own use, including their military artificial intelligence applications, as well as their social credit score.

Keith Krach:
I mean, you look at that and then, you know, but none flows out and then reciprocally all the propaganda goes out, but the truth does not come in. And what they’re doing is they’re extending their great one way firewall to, you know, to really, you know, export that all around the world to influence operations, influence different countries, influence different political systems. So this is something where this tech state craft model that we develop while we were building the Clean Network Alliance of Democracies that integrates Silicon valley strategies with foreign policy tools, all based on this trust doctrine. That’s where that this model works in all those different areas. So that’s the key thing that we’ve gotta do.

Simone Gao:
On one side, there is the alliance of democracies, on the other side, we start to see a China-Russia alliance taking shape quickly. In recent years, Russia and China have significantly deepened their bilateral ties, with Putin and Xi going so far as to proclaim that their countries’ “friendship has no limits.” China and Russia share economic and security interests, an authoritarian style of government, and a common enemy- The United States. Cooperation on high-tech has become an important element of this strategic partnership with areas of collaboration include, for example, artificial intelligence (AI), big data, robotics, and biotechnology. Furthermore, China has also become Russia’s largest supplier of semiconductors and consumer electronics over time.

Simone Gao:
My last question, are you concerned about a China-Russia technological alliance against the West and what should be done about it?

Keith Krach:
Well, the totalitarian twins, they signed their love letter back there, early February, right before the Olympics, this pact between Putin and Xi, and, you know, that’s where they both agreed. You know, that was, that was a green light for Putin to attack and this bloody war in Ukraine and commit all these war crimes and also, you know, Russia’s backing China on Taiwan so, you know, but the bloom has come off the roses for both these totalitarian states. I think the world has really woken up that these guys they’re up to no good. And they want to take, you know, countries’ freedoms away. They’re exporting that model. Now the good news is they don’t trust each other. And they never will, you know, but I could tell you who has the upper hand in that relationship, you could see it in that love letter, is China that’s for sure. And by the way, that’s more reason Simone, why an alliance of democracies based on this trust doctrine, which is something that they fear so much because they know if it’s a battle that involves values and ideals, we’ll win every time.

Simone Gao:
Thank you. The secretary Krach for joining Zooming In today again.

Keith Krach:
Thanks so much for having me Simone.

Who Will Be the Next Victim of Organ Harvesting after China Exhaust Falun Gong and Uyghers?

Simone: In our last episode, Ethan Gutmann told me that by 2014, the number of organs harvested from the Falun Gong practitioners were running lower, because some practitioners were persecuted to death, some were aging and others fled China. Also in 2014, the Chinese Communist Party Secretary General Xi Jinping announced a policy called “people’s war on terror”. As part of the policy, the Xinjiang Internment camps, officially called vocational education and training centers that are used to indoctrinate Uyghers and other Muslims started to erect. Also starting from 2015, the Chinese government announced that every Uighur in Xinjiang must have their health checked, mainly their blood tested. By 2017, the internment camps became operational.

The camps have been criticized by the governments of many countries and human rights organizations for alleged human rights abuses, including mistreatment, rape, and torture, with some of them alleging genocide.

These camps constitute the largest-scale arbitrary detention of ethnic and religious minorities since World War II. As of 2020, it was estimated that 1 to 3 million people, mostly Uyghurs, had been detained in these secretive camps throughout the region.

Ethan Gutmann interviewed 10 people who were from these camps.

Ethan Gutmann: What I can do is try to interview people who’d been inside the camps. What did you see? And I asked them who went missing? Who left the camp? And they said, well, sometimes some, occasionally an old person would leave the camp because they got sick.

And I’m like, okay. And they’d say, but there was a definite group who left the camp and they were usually about 18 years old. And I said, tell me about that. And they said, well, this is young, this is very young people. They’re about 18 and maybe girls, right. And young women. And they would, would’ve be announced at lunch, usually that they were graduating. This is the term they used ‘graduating,’ which meant that they were going to work in a factory out east, in Eastern China.

Yeah. They were not gonna come back. They wouldn’t see their families again. They were just gonna go and work in some factory. Or sometimes they were going to work in a cotton plantation, essentially a place where they pick cotton and grow cotton in Xinjiang; sometimes they were going in Xinjiang. A lot of times out east, whatever. They would announce this. And it was almost like an award.

It was like people were sometimes they even encouraged you to applaud a little bit for these young women who were going away. Well, that was done very openly, but there was one other group. They all said, well, there’s this other group. And this is about, I’m talking about 10 witnesses, which doesn’t seem like much, but we only have 10 witnesses over here in the West. So these are 10 in Kazakhstan.

So I’m doubling the witnesses essentially, which is not easy. And they, what’s the other group? Well, they said, well, these other people would disappear in the middle of the night. I said, well, what were the circumstances that? Well, they say, well, we don’t really know. We except that they, we were all given a blood test. I said, when did you give them the blood test? And you know about a week before. So they’re given this blood test. And then a week later, three or four people, whatever they remember, would leave in the middle, would just be gone the next day. What was their age? 28.

Their age was 28. Usually sometimes 29. Sometimes it was 30 or sometimes 26 or 27. But it was always right around the age of 28. Now 28 is the magic number. It’s when the Chinese prefer to, the Chinese doctors prefer to harvest organs because their organs are completely mature. But your, your health is perfect. It’s as good as it will ever be. And I asked one woman, I said, well, okay, they were given these blood tests and then they were somehow selected. Some people even described them, the people who ended up being gone, were given vests, like a colored vest, pink or orange, some. One case they had described them giving a little bracelet. They didn’t know what it meant, but then they were gone.

You weren’t supposed to talk about them or mention them ever again. One woman was a teacher and she describes how she was a Chinese teacher. So she sort of worked for the camp but she was treated pretty badly too, and because she was Kazakh. And she, they had a kind of faculty lounge, you know, a place where they could kind of hang out a little bit, and they put up the results from the blood tests. And then they put check marks, pink check marks by the blood, certain names. And those people disappeared.

Now I was concerned about this, but I wanted to check out that there wasn’t something else going on. So I asked, this Uighur woman. I said, look, uh, I said, this is an embarrassing question. I’m sorry to ask it. But these three friends of yours or these three people, you knew, these three women who disappeared in the middle of the night, t I said, were they beautiful?

Were they good looking? Were they sexually attractive? And she came back and said, I don’t like to say this about anybody, but no, they were not beautiful. I said, well what do they have in common if anything? And she said they were healthy.

So this is where it ends. I mean, this is about organs. These are people going off to their death. And if you put the figures together, they’re incredibly consistent from camp to camp. Everybody I interviewed was from a different camp. Every single person. And every one of them described disappearances. And some said it was 2.5% of the entire camp that disappeared in the middle of the night. Some said it was 5%. Some said it was 10% but only one or two. Some said it was like 1%. But everybody describes that figures are very, very close. 2.5 to 5%.

In other words, 25,000 people or 50,000 people are being taken from the camps for organ harvesting every year, 25 to 50,000 people. That’s probably in the middle, there are 32,000, something like that. Now there’s another way of looking at that figure. Let’s look at it in terms of organs for a minute. Let’s say you can take two organs from each person that you can use. That would be 50,000 organs, right? Let’s say you can take, um, let’s say it’s the higher figure, 50,000. And you can take three organs. It’s 150,000 organs. So if China is doing a hundred thousand organ transplants a year, you can see how this can pretty much fill the gap completely, very easily. Right? It’s not a problem.

Simone: They don’t like to waste organs, I mean…

Ethan Gutmann: Well…

Simone: One person’s organ can maybe like…

Ethan Gutmann: You know, it’s funny, you mentioned that because it’s something we’ve argued about – me and Kilgour and Matas – many times – they used to say, oh well you can only take one organ per person. And I’m like, why? Chinese don’t like to waste things. I’m always making that point. And I said, this is a very, it’s a very practical culture. And that’s something I actually find very admirable and appealing about Chinese culture is it’s a culture where you don’t waste, you figure out ways to use things.

And I think what you’re saying is right. However, the logistics of getting, let’s say I have all these perfect organs, and the logistics of getting my organs to all these different people is somewhat complicated. So it could even be less. I mean it could well be the smaller figure, only 25,000 a year, but I will not go below that figure. I would not. I would be misrepresenting the witnesses to go below that figure. This is what they told me. They had no reason to, they didn’t, most of them didn’t even know they were talking about organ harvesting.

I would often tell them after the interview. This is what, why I was asking those particular questions, but I did not lead them on. And I was not interested in people making up exaggerated numbers for me. I had no interest in that at all. And what struck me again, and one of the reasons why I was so relaxed when I was asking the questions, was because at this point I’m very used to it. Everybody says the same thing.

Okay. So to me, there’s no real question in my mind. There’s one last data point. One last piece of evidence that I think I find personally compelling. There are others, but picture a hospital out in a place called Aksu. And this hospital was built for SARS patients back in 2000 or 2001, 2002. This hospital was converted to a hospital for religious dissidents, that is probably extreme Muslims or something.

And then it becomes, it’s renamed again, it’s called the Aksu Infection Hospital and it does transplants. And I know this because … I’m sorry, Gulchehra Hoja of Radio Free Asia actually, called them up and checked in on this and they do do transplants. Okay.

So here’s this transplant hospital. Imagine that they build a labor camp or prison camp for 33,000 people around it. That’s what they did. So it’s facing the road, but around it is 33,000 people, around this hospital. Picture then 900 meters away, less than a kilometer away, is another camp with 16,000 people.

Then to the north is a crematorium. It’s the largest crematorium I’ve ever seen on earth in Google earth. I’ve looked at others. It’s four or five times the usual size. It’s quite extraordinary. It was recently repainted. I’ve talked to people who worked in that area. They all described the smell of burning bone. They all knew it was a crematorium. And it’s not a secret. 20 minutes from that, 20 minute drive, is an airport, Aksu airport. And this has a green lane, which literally says ‘human organ transplant lane’, ‘fast lane’.

It’s a fast lane. Yes, absolutely marked. It has arrows. They’re on the floor and they’re, it’s marked above, ‘human organ transplant lane’. It’s in three different languages.

This is, it’s export only. It’s not to bring organs into Aksu. It’s to take organs out of Aksu. Well, after some, we did some research on that and had a very good researcher who knew, knew about the Chinese medical system. And she found out that hospital, Aksu Infection Hospital, has a big brother hospital on the east coast of China or near the east coast, near Shanghai. And First Hospital has their, in 2017, their kidney transplants went up by a hundred percent and their liver transplants went up by 200%.

This is huge increases. And they were the first hospital, in 2020, in March 2020, when the pandemic was a full swing, they announced that they had done the first double lung transplant of a COVID patient in history. And this was announced not only in Chinese, but in English.

Simone: Oh, I know that hospital. Do you know the name of it?

Ethan Gutmamnn: It’s First Hospital. There’s also another one, which was Wuxi Hospital, which the same day came out and did the same thing. That was under Dr. Chen. Chen Lin or whatever. Cheong Lynn is a very famous guy. He’s very competitive guy. He came out with the same thing on the same day. First Hospital still claims to be first. Yeah, that’s right. I’m sorry, Chen Jingyu.

Yeah. So he, yeah, Chen Jingyu. He’s also the one who created the, the fast lines. He created the green lanes,, the fast lanes in the airport that came from him because he was very upset when China Southern Airlines airplane took off and he was holding organs in organs and boxes that he was going to transplant. The organs died, you know, essentially ran out of time.

Simone: Where did you get that story?

Ethan Gutmann: I don’t know. I don’t know where I read it, but it’s, I mean, it’s just out there. I think he even interviewed and talked about it a long time and said, this is how we ended up with getting these fast lanes. You know, this was a, so he’s a very powerful guy, China Southern airlines said, oh, we’ll do something special. And they even have an ad with banners and green banners. And yeah.

So the point is that, we can, looking at that, we can say, you know, as much as we had a tremendous amount of information about Falun Gong organ harvesting, we’ve never actually had something quite like this before. Where it’s all in the same spot and you can sort of see it physically how this evolves and how it moves. And that is partly because there aren’t that many differences between Falun Gong organ harvesting and Uiguhr organ harvesting.

It is really very the same program. There’s a lot of consistency. And the one big difference is that they have put it into a discrete area. Xinjiang. An area where no one can go. Journalists cannot go there. Politicians don’t go there. Look at the UN, right.

Michelle Bachelet was just there and she wouldn’t go, actually go into Xinjiang. No one could look at it. And because of that, we have this … that means that the World Health Organization or the Transplantation Society can pretend, if they want to, that nothing’s going on. They’ll even say that; they’ll even say, well, I visited some hospitals in China. It’s like, what does that have to do with it? East coast hospitals, aren’t doing, aren’t cutting people open anymore. They’re just receiving organs and transplanting them. That’s not the same thing.

Simone: What’s the difference between the Falun Gong era and the Uighur era in terms of transplanting?

Ethan Gutmann: Really just what I’ve, the difference between the Falun Gong era and the Uighur era is, is simply one of, kind of locational. And… one of the reasons that can happen is because we have this system, ECMO, which can keep organs alive, even in a dead body at times. It oxygenates the organs. It keeps them going and you can use it for live organ harvesting, and you can do it with a dead patient to where you can keep a kidney, for example, alive. You can, if a doctor wants to – it’s the middle of the night and you’re gonna transplant this kidney, but you’re all tired.

A doctor can just say, you know what, we’re all going home for the night, get some sleep, come back in the morning. You know, and eight hours later, they start up again and they take the organ out and transplant it.

Simone: From the dead person’s body.

Ethan Gutmann: Yes. And that’s because of ECMO because it’s keeping this oxygenation is essentially keeping the organ alive, almost like a flower and water. Okay. The flower is still alive. It hasn’t wilted. And if you were to put it back in the ground, somehow with new roots, it would grow again as if nothing had ever happened.

Simone: In terms of the number of transplants what’s the difference? Which one is bigger?

Ethan Gutmann: I think they’re, I think it’s almost exactly the same. This is one of the strangest questions I get is that, you know, every group assumes that it’s gotta be bigger or smaller. But it isn’t because China has reached its peak. It’s reached where it wants to be in terms of…

Simone: What do you mean, reach what peak?

Ethan Gutmann: Well, it’s reached the point where it’s got the customers. It’s not an industry I see that’s building anymore. It’s mature. What we call a mature industry. And it became a mature industry really under Falun Gong. We know that the curve with Falun Gong was almost like this. In other words, it went up and then it leveled. Okay.

So by the time we put out a report in 2016, it was a level curve. It wasn’t going up. We never claimed it was. It was clearly like this. And then what happened when the Uighurs came in, is maybe you got a little jump or something, but not much of one. And then it hits level because China is where it wants to be with this. I believe that many people in the Chinese medical system would love to stop doing organ harvesting.

And many of them would like for China to make its money from the industry that always should have made its money from which was pharmaceuticals. This is the pillar industry. This is China’s destiny. Its future is to make great medicines. Right.

And, and try them out on their poor people. But, you know, whatever. But, you know, I mean, seriously, I don’t mean it that way, but I, I do mean that that is, it’s an inventive medical culture. Maybe they take a little too many risks sometimes. We’ve just seen that with COVID that hasn’t been so great for the world. I think they took too many risks.

I think it probably did get out of a lab, but I don’t know for sure. But what I would say is that, you know, at the same time, there’s a certain genius within the Chinese medical culture, which is not being realized by organ harvesting. Organ harvesting is holding the entire country back, their future…

The future lies in pharmaceuticals and to sell pharmaceuticals globally. That’s where the profits are. You must have the confidence of the populations in the world. And nobody has confidence in Sinovac in the Chinese vaccine that they came up with. Nobody has confidence in a medical system that would butcher its own people. Nobody will ever have confidence that the transplant game is anything but a dirty filthy business, because that’s what it is.

And that’s why they will never get the voluntary donations that they talk about. Because the ordinary person knows that it’s a dirty business. And if they’re gonna give up their organs, they ought to be paid a hell of a lot of money for it because they know those surgeons are making a hell of a lot of dirty filthy money. That is the problem here.

This is a dead end for everybody. But so it’s beyond just the simple tragedy – it’s beyond the tragedy of those lives lost. It is beyond that. It is a tragedy for Chinese culture. It’s a tragedy for Chinese science. Okay. And it’s a cancer in the world.

Simone: So although not many people in the world are talking about this forced organ harvesting, but the trust in China’s medical system is gone.

Ethan Gutmann: I think it’s gone. I don’t know. I mean, anything could be rebuilt; but the terrifying thing to me is that you have Western doctors who want to rebuild trust in China’s medical system before they have even reformed it. Okay. Just because they say a few nice things about reform, and that even if they were to reform it, that they wanna do it without ANY accountability to the hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong and now at least a hundred thousand Uiguhrs, at least that have gone under the knife in this country.

And they want to do it without any accountability, without any talking, without any victim restitution, without any attempt to regain that DNA, or match it, which is actually quite doable. You could match these things. This was something that was impossible during the Holocaust. We didn’t have the technology to do it. People just disappeared. They were gassed. They were gone. This isn’t true today. Evidence is there.

Simone: That’s, I mean, you have all this evidence, that from the Falun Gong era to the Uighur era, things really didn’t change in China.

Ethan Gutmann: No.

Simone: And…

Ethan Gutmann: It’s not even an era. It’s not like the two eras have gone. I mean, that’s another thing I’d like to add the, you know, I didn’t have time to say this in the conference yesterday, but the point is that’s because we were under such a short amount of time, but the fact is two of my witnesses in Kazakhstan said they saw Falun Gong in their camps.

Simone: They moved Falun Gong practitioners to Xinjiang. What percentage?

Ethan Gutmann: Yeah, it was, it was just a couple, I mean, it wasn’t a lot of people, but it was a few,. But both, the two of them mentioned it. I mean, so that’s 10% of my witnesses right there. Okay. And we’re saying…

Simone: Two from two different camps?

Ethan Gutmann: Yes. Two from two different camps. And I said, what happened to them? They didn’t know. They just weren’t, they weren’t, particularly – I mean, people aren’t aware of everything going on in their camp.

Simone: Do you think the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese current regime, will exhaust the Uiguhr population for transplant and possibly move on to another ethnic group or other group of people?

Ethan Gutmann: That’s a really good question. And I actually, haven’t tried to calculate it, but I will. Okay. I’ll try to figure that out.

Simone: Because I mean, for Falun Gong, the age and stuff, that’s a different scenario with the Uighurs.

Ethan Gutmann: Yes, it is. Yeah.

Simone: But with Uighurs they try to not let them reproduce, right? They want to…

Ethan Gutmann: Yeah. There’s a basic attempt to sterilize the women. Okay, so that’s a difference. This is an interesting point you just hit, because, you know, there were times when I’ve looked at the Uighur population and said, well, this is very different than Falun Gong because it’s more of an economic enterprise. Falun Gong it was a, you know…

It was, they considered a direct threat to the Chinese state. The Uiguhr, the business, oh, well, they’re a direct threat to the Chinese state. It’s kind of an exaggeration. It’s kind of make believe. It’s like, well, they’re terrorists. So they’re potentially this great threat, but they aren’t. They aren’t a great threat. So in fact, I would say that’s a huge difference.

In a sense, Falun Gong really was a threat to the Chinese state because it was a different, had a different vision of China. The Uighurs don’t offer that they offer a vision of a maybe their own state, you know, independent of China. That’s not the same thing. So that difference is significant. But it’s also significant that the Uighurs were an economic enterprise. They have become that. They’re forced labor. They’re used as slave labor.

Now, Falun Gong were also used for slave labor, but it was the petty things. It was the usual things they do in labor camps, where they make you do all kinds of stupid work. This is much more systematic. It’s like, you’re gonna pick all the cotton. You’re going to work at the factories, certain factories for Western companies at really dirty jobs that are very dangerous, and you’re gonna live in a completely different dorm, and there’s gonna be guns there.

And you’re not gonna mate an all this stuff. The interesting thing is you go back to the old south in America, the plantation system, and, you know, the plantation owner was happy, okay, if the slaves were mating. Because it was like growing your population. It was like growing your resources. It’s like getting a new car. Okay.

And maybe it was, you know, you had to take care of that car, but it was like getting another car. And it’s resources. And the truth is the Chinese, I think, and this is what really does make it racial in a way, that they really don’t want that. I believe they’re almost torn between this instinct to just wipe these people out. I mean by Chinese standards, you know, 20 million people or 13 million people is not that many people. It’s very small population, they’re deemed to be troublesome. So be it.

On the other hand, maybe they, you know, the Uighurs have proved themselves to be sort of valuable in this forced labor area.

The problem we have in organ harvesting in particular is that any human being, really most human beings are not worth half a million dollars. But on the open market, these organs being sold to foreign organ tourists are worth at least half a million dollars. So the equation doesn’t work well anymore. They’re worth more dead than alive.

And I do believe that’s going to continue for a long time. But your question about how long and how much excess their population there is, is a really good one and something I’ll put in my mind to try to solve if possible.

An Industry of Genocide: Why China’s Organ Harvesting Can’t Be Stopped? A Chat with Ethan Gutmann

Simone: China declared that it had stopped using prisoners’ organs for transplantation, and it solely depends on organ donations. But there is a problem.

Ethan Gutmann: So they started showing these voluntary donation numbers and the curve was perfect. And they very quickly came up with the fact that this curve was based on an equation.

Simone: The transplant industry exploded in China at the same rate as the explosion of Falun Gong flowing into jails and labor camps. They, and later the Uighurs, experienced the same bizarre routine.

Ethan Gutmann: So they’re given this blood test. And then a week later, three or four people, whatever they remember, would leave in the middle, would just be gone the next day. What was their age? 28.

Simone: Reports on systematic organ harvesting from Falun Gong prisoners first emerged in 2006. 16 years later, this practice is still going on. The victims have expanded from Falun Gong to the Uighurs. Why couldn’t it be stopped?

And who could be the next victims? I spoke with Ethan Gutmann, a pioneer researcher in this field and the author of the book “The Slaughter: Mass Killings, Organ Harvesting, and China’s Secret Solution to Its Dissident Problem”.

Simone: On March 17, 2006, Annie, a woman who used to work at the Liaoning Thrombosis Hospital of Integrated Chinese and Western Medicine in Sujiatun District, Shenyang disclosed to The Epoch Times that her hospital secretly detained a large number of Falun Gong practitioners.

Her ex-husband was involved in the surgery to remove organs from living Falun Gong practitioners. Since then, a large number of independent investigators have investigated the matter and have confirmed that the Chinese government has been conducting state-sanctioned, systematic forced organ harvesting from living prisoners of conscience, mainly Falun Gong practitioners, for organ transplantation. Ethan Gutmann is one of those investigators.

The Chinese government has always denied harvesting organs from prisoners of conscience or death row prisoners. However, after the revelation of the organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners, the Chinese Minister of Health, Huang Jiefu, suddenly admitted that most of the organs for organ transplants in China came from executed prisoners. His remarks are widely seen as an attempt to cover up the greater crime of organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience.

China officially announced in 2015 that it would stop using organs from executed prisoners. But there is evidence that organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience and political prisoners has not stopped in China.

Simone: So Ethan, you said in your speech that there’s evidence that forced organ harvesting in China is still going on. Tell me about that again.

Ethan Gutmann: Well, it is a complex picture, like everything in organ harvesting; we’ve had to do it. We’ve had to learn new techniques every time because the Chinese communist party always learns. So for example, they came out and said in 2015, we are no longer harvesting prisoners for their organs.

Now, what they didn’t tell you was two things. They didn’t tell you that they had denied ever harvesting, Falun Gong or Tibetans or Uighurs, or house Christians for their organs. So they were just speaking of prisoners on death row; prisoners who were convicted to death.

And they’re saying, we’re not harvesting them anymore, but even then they were lying because in their own press, they were saying, oh, no, prisoners can still be harvested. As long as they fill out the right forms. That’s all; the only difference was what they were saying in English and what they were saying in Chinese.

And to this day, the World Health Organization and the Transplantation Society, choose to act like they actually said we’re no longer harvesting prisoners.

Simone: So they endorsed their statement.

Ethan Gutmann: Well, they said that statement in English, but in the Chinese, they said something completely different. And I can show you the references if you like, because they were all over the Chinese media. They very quickly tried to reassure everybody in the country that don’t worry. There won’t be any shortage in organs. Okay.

Leaving that aside. Let’s say the English part counted. Well, the problem was that we had been working with some Falun Gong practitioners for many years. Me, Kil ..when I say me, I mean, Kilgore, Matas, myself, had been working with some Falun Gong practitioners for many years who’d been working. Actually it was two groups who’d been trying to estimate, volume, transplant volume in China, and they had done almost a, it was almost a superhuman effort to come up with this stuff, but they had traced every hospital they could and said, okay, how many, how many organs are they harvesting a year?

These weren’t estimates. They had to actually say how many organs they were harvesting every year. But what we, what quickly what’s striking about it is that even just putting a couple of hospitals together, you came up to a figure of 10,000. Now 10,000 was the figure that the Chinese medical establishment had been claiming for almost 10 years. They’ve been saying we do 10,000 transplants a year. Okay.

So we could come up with that with just a few hospitals, but we certainly, but then we realized there were 163 hospitals which were authorized by the Chinese state to do transplants. And when we started going, you know, estimating other, looking at other hospitals, we came up to numbers that were quite spectacular. In fact, we very quickly came up with a figure of at least 50,000.

Then when you started adding in some of the hospitals, which had actually claimed they were doing, you know, 5,000 transplants a year, we were up to a number of 60,000 to a hundred thousand. In fact, truthfully the figure came out to about 120,000. I did those figures. And it was about 120,000 per year.

Now I know something about China having lived there. You know, when somebody catches a fish in China, they catch a fish. They describe it. The fish is this big. It’s not, it’s really about this big, okay. Okay. So people exaggerate by about 20, 25% in most cases. So I said, okay, let’s lower it to a hundred thousand, not 120,000, a hundred thousand. Some people have said 90,000 instead. I don’t really care. It’s, we’re talking, either way, we’re talking about a figure of 80,000, transplants per year, something like that.

That’s very different than 10,000. So there was something very wrong with the Chinese story. So if they were no longer accepting, organs from prisoners or harvesting organs from prisoners. How would they get them? Well, the Chinese got very busy and they did two things. First of all, they started to say, well, actually we’re doing more than 10,000 per year. We’re moving very quickly.

Now, now we’re doing about 20,000 per year. But they also showed the voluntary donations going up. So in other words, they were trying to match our numbers, see how this is working. Okay. This is like, when you catch somebody in a lie and they start going, well, you know, no, I didn’t do that. I mean, I did some of that, but not that, some of it, and don’t worry, it’s no longer, I’m not longer, I’m no longer doing it.

Right. So they started showing these voluntary donation numbers and the curve was perfect. It was going like this. Well, that made me very curious, but it also made Matt Robertson and Jacob Levy and a statistician, very curious. And they got together and did, an advanced statistical study.

And they very quickly came up with the fact that this curve was based on an equation, a simple equation. So in other words, it’s a parabolic curve. That’s based on an equation. The chances of real life of getting voluntary donations to go up in that form are impossible. Okay. They’re a million to one. It doesn’t happen in real life. Quadratic curves like that only occur in design. Right?

So they were obviously lying about the voluntary donation in China. And, you know, you have to say, well, if they’re lying about them, then why wouldn’t they just tell the truth?

If they had a successful voluntary donation campaign. But they didn’t. Right, so we had a problem. So right there, we knew that something was wrong, but I think a larger signal that I was particularly attuned to, because don’t forget, I had studied, done direct research on Uighurs being harvested years ago. Kilgour and Matas didn’t do that. Matt Robertson didn’t do that, nor did Jacob Levy.

I was the first person to go out and start interviewing Uiguhrs about the 1990s before Falun Gong was even being oppressed. And what I’d found was that some, first of all, that live organ harvesting had first taken place in Xinjiang, in Northwest China. That they tried it out there for the first time.

And we have a doctor who actually did that. Envor Tohti who actually was forced to do such an operation. The man who’d been shot; the body was in shock, but the man was not dead. In fact, as Envor Tohti has more recently said if he had worked, operated on that man, the man could have survived. He killed him on the operating table.

So that’s what happened. He took out a kidney and two kidneys and a liver and, and the man died; the man expired. And he was alive when he was making the operation; you know, because the blood was pulsing. That was in 1995. So we know for a fact that live organ harvesting was taking place in Xinjiang.

In 1997 there’s a demonstration in Ghulja, in Xinjiang. It was over Ramadan. They weren’t allowed to practice Ramadan. And some of the Uighurs came to this town hall to demonstrate, and the Chinese police shot a lot of them. And then they went on. There was a lot of them. They arrested them en masse and so forth.

But what we also know is that in Ürümqiin, in the capital, for the first time, they started doing blood tests of the prisoners, political prisoners.

That’s new. Up til now all of Chinese organ harvesting – and it’s not that big a program – has been taking place on, on prisoners, regular prisoners. People who’ve who’ve committed crimes; sometimes very serious crimes.

And who’ve been sentenced to death. Now, I don’t know if those sentences are correct or wrong, or, uh, you know, I’m not there with a clipboard, but I can tell you that. I’m sure a lot of those people, you know, a lot of those people were duly sentenced to death; some were murderers and so forth. This was different. These were political prisoners. These were people who put their fist in the air and said, Allah akbar.

And suddenly they’re getting blood tested. And then five or maybe six Chinese cadres arrived. Very high ranking Chinese Communist Party cadres came in, presumably from Beijing, flew into Ürümqiin, and a Uighur doctor whom I interviewed was told to go in and do the blood tests again on the prisoners.

And he said, well, why? And he said, because they need kidneys. They’re here to get kidneys from these prisoners. And he sort of, I guess, looked a little alarmed or something. And then his supervisor said, don’t worry. These are very bad people. These are very bad people, very bad people. This is for the state.

It’s a good thing for the state. So anyways, these high ranking Communist Party cadres got their kidneys . Then they left. And then a couple of months later, some more came in.

Simone: That was when?

Ethan Gutmann: Now that’s in 1997. So in 1999 …and then it sort of died off, and maybe it could have all ended there, but in 1999, China declares the crackdown on Falun Gong and declares, doesn’t even declare Falun Gong illegal, but just treats it as illegal. And by 2000 you start getting the first exams in prisons and detention centers throughout China.

And initially they were very, very scared about doing these exams. The interesting thing is in 2000, 2001. I’ve talked to many Falun Gong practitioners who experienced those exams. And often it was like one at a time. They’d go to these medical exams. There’d be a man with two armed police on both sides of them. So there was a very intense process. They were very worried about something happening.

In fact the practitioners themselves did not have any special insight as to why they were being examined. And most of them, organ harvesting did not occur to them at all.

Simone: Did they? This is in retrospect. They realize what well …

Ethan Gutmann: And now, now they were… not always. You know, one of the interesting things about persecution is that there’s a great tendency for denial. What we call denial. You know, one of the ways. Yes, for the victim, because often one of the ways you keep your spirits up or keep yourself kind of, okay, is you don’t think about the worst thing.

That’s the way some people handle it. Some people think always about the worst. Some people it’s better they don’t think about the worst. So they go, there’s no way they’d do that to me. Or that won’t happen. So for example, I did meet a woman who was one of the earliest cases who had clearly been examined for her organs. And she – this is in Australia – and she said, oh, they never would’ve harvested me. I’m too important. Okay.

Now, in fact, they were examining her for organs and maybe she just didn’t have a good match. Who knows; maybe she was right. I don’t think she was right. I think she was wrong, but who knows? The bottom line is to make a long story short here, the transplant industry exploded in China because at the same rate, as the explosion of Falun Gong into the, what we call the Laogai system of China, the prisons, the black jails, the mental hospitals, obviously labor camps…

And that explosion hits every province. Every province builds a transplant hospital. Everybody gets in on the act, the techniques improve. They start learning how to use lungs, hearts. These become common over time. So they’re experimenting with people and the waiting time for an organ very quickly goes from, you know, China traditionally had a waiting time for organs of a couple of months or something like that.

It’s suddenly two weeks or less. You know, that’s what people leave out. They say, oh, until two weeks. No, it was actually less In 2006, there are several cases of hospitals which did emergency liver transplants. That is somebody comes in with an, an acute liver crisis. Okay. They’re at the point of death.

And four hours later, they have a matching liver and it’s transplanted. And the person, the day after the person is magically rising from the hospital bed. And this is unbelievable stuff. It’s the stuff of science fiction.

And it was only made possible because there were so many Falun Gong in detention. And so many had been tested for their organs, that there was a stable of tissue types, a stable of cross matching, where you could select, you had all these possibilities and you could select from them and pull one out.

That was a perfect or close to perfect match for whoever had a problem. And you could do it that fast. So this is, this is an astounding, point even in 2006. So by 2015, what’s changed? Well the year before 2015 there’s some evidence that they were starting to run out of Falun Gong or at least young Falun Gong practitioners.

Up til then they had been harvesting Falung Gong and mainly young Falun Gong. We’ve seen the records on this. Now they’re not recorded as Falun Gong, but it’s very clear. They say 28 year old male dies of heart failure.

Okay. And I really wanna make sure your camera catches this. 28 year old dies of heart failure. What are the chances? Do you know anyone? Have you heard of anyone in your life who has died of heart failure at age 28?

Do you have a friend or a friend of a friend who’s died of heart failure at age 28? This is nearly impossible. Okay. And that is one of the reasons that 28 year-olds are so valuable for organs. But Falun Gong is aging at this point. A lot of Falun Gong …. Some Falun Gong had left China. Some very dedicated people had been killed and a lot of people had gotten older.

So at that point in nine provinces, in 2014, the police start showing up in Falun Gong homes and opening the door and saying, you’re doing a blood test. Police doing this. And they do a cheek swab, a DNA cheek, swab. The combination of DNA and blood leads you to a perfect organ match. It’s the best possible match you can get.

Simone: Are you talking about, they go to, they went to Falun Gong homes to test Falun Gong practitioners?

Ethan Gutmann: Yes. Falun Gong homes to/for Falun Gong practitioners. These are people who are not in prison. They’re not in jail. They’re not in – they’re just Falun Gong at this point. Maybe they’ve been in the head brush with the law before. Maybe they’ve had a little trouble before, but at this point, they’re just at home. The significance of that…

At first, when I heard about this story, this came out in Minghui. And when I first heard about it, I said, this is a scare tactic. They’re just trying to scare people. They can’t really be doing this. But I was wrong. They were. They were trying to select. to see if they could get them from their homes. They’re looking for young people.

Simone: Do you have evidence that people who were tested at home, forced tested at home, were taken away?

Ethan Gutmann: Well, we know we do have some evidence that a lot of them were arrested later on pretext. So we don’t know about did they, were, they just grabbed from their homes and take it away? Probably not. That’s not the way that … that’s not the way the CCP works.

They tend to not want to do things that way. They’ll sort of say you’re being arrested for this and that. And then, then you just disappear into that system. Now, as Matas has pointed out, and a lot of practitioners have pointed out too, Falun Gong were extremely vulnerable of across us because they were not giving their names in many cases, and not even saying which province they were from.

So that meant that their families couldn’t really advocate for them. And of course they were trying to protect their families from damage. Similar situation arises with the Uighurs.

But we’ll get into that briefly. The bottom line is that what this tells us that about 2014, they’re running out; they’re, they’re going low on this. Uh, and what happens in 2015? There’s an announcement that every Uighur in Xinjiang has to be health checked, given a health check.

Every Uighur above the age of 12 must some mandatory health check. People formed long lines all over in bizaars and in shopping centers and all kinds of places, school houses, and were given health checks. These were basically blood tests and other brief tests. But the main thing was the blood test. What they’re trying to do is map out the population. Han Chinese half of Xinjiang, as you know, is Han Chinese.

They didn’t have to take any tests. There was no mandatory health check for them at all. Okay. So this was Uighurs and I believe Kazakhs, I’m not even sure about Hui… Yeah. Hui too, at that time, I’m not even sure they were sort of, they were always in between. Okay. They’re giving that test. That’s 2015. By 2016, the camps have begun. And the tests are done. That’s when, you know, these people start pouring into these camps. Okay.

Simone: So 2015, they had the test. In 2016, they built the camps and they put those, people who had been tested to the camps.

Ethan Gutmann: Right. And the interesting thing of course is that the camps did, were featuring mainly young …. They were going after young people and middle aged people, they weren’t going that much after…

Simone: Not like every single one who has been tested is, is put into camp.

Ethan Gutmann: No, no, because older people are pretty much exempt from all this. In a sense, you can say whatever’s happening to older people is sort of for show. We don’t tend to think of them as great candidates for organs. You can use elderly organs, but I wouldn’t. Why would you trade an old, you know, if I needed an organ, why would I trade it for another old organ?

I mean that doesn’t make a lot of sense. The point is this … when we look at the camps and what happened to Uighur villages, for example, they became places – and many people have described this who’ve been through them – with nothing but little kids and old women. Sometimes elderly men. So it’s like elderly people and little kids and all the rest of the people are gone.

There are no young people. Okay. There’s I mean, any adolescents were in there – you know, all the way from 15 up and people of 45 were in there. The rest is just left behind.

Now, what we know at this point is that 2017, the camps are fully constructed and we probably have, and it’s very hard to make these estimates, but based on what we see from satellite technology, it’s probably at least 2 million in the camps at that point. It’s an extraordinary number.

Now I tend to use the figure 1 million, because it’s a conservative figure. It’s simple to defend. I think everybody can accept that at least 1 million people are in the camps. Even now, 1 million people in the camps. And what I did, and this is, I think, the important point I bring in here, is that I went to Kazakhstan because…

I only was interested in talking to people who’d actually been inside the camps. I wasn’t interested in family members. That’s not that I wasn’t interested, but they weren’t helpful to me. Stories about people who they … you know, my mother’s in the camp.

I mean, I can’t help with this. There’s nothing I can do. What I can do is try to interview people who’d been inside the camps. What did you see? And I asked them who went missing? Who left the camp? And they said, well, sometimes some, occasionally an old person would leave the camp because they got sick.

And I’m like, okay. And they’d say, but there was a definite group who left the camp and they were usually about 18 years old. And I said, tell me about that. And they said, well, this is young. This is very young people. Uh they’re they’re about 18 and, and maybe girls, right. And young women.

And they would, would’ve be announced at lunch, usually that they were graduating. This is the term they used ‘graduating,’ which meant that they were going to work in a factory out east, in Eastern China.

Yeah. They were not gonna come back. They wouldn’t see their families again. They were just gonna go and work in some factory. Or sometimes they were going to work in a cotton plantation, essentially a place where they pick cotton and grow cotton in Xinjiang; sometimes they were going in Xinjiang.

A lot of times out east, whatever. They would announce this. And it was almost like an award. It was like people were sometimes they even encouraged you to applaud a little bit for these young women who were going away. Well, that was done very openly but there was one other group.

They all said, well, there’s this other group. And this is about, um, talking about 10 witnesses, which doesn’t seem like much, but we only have 10 witnesses over here in the west. So these are 10 in Kazakhstan.

So I’m doubling the witnesses essentially, which is not easy. And they what’s the other group? Well, they said, well, these other people would disappear in the middle of the night. I said, well, what were the circumstances that?

Well, they say, well, we don’t really know. We except that they, we were all given a blood test. I said, when did you give them the blood test? And you know about a week before. So they’re given this blood test. And then a week later, three or four people, whatever they remember, would leave in the middle, would just be gone the next day. What was their age? 28.

What Has Beijing Learned from War on Ukraine, an Interview with James Fanell | Zooming In

Simone Gao: When the war on Ukraine is turning more and more frustrating for Russia, both Beijing and Taipei are watching closely.

If you were a senior Chinese general at this point, would you suggest Xi Jinping, uh, take or not to take Taiwan by force because of, you know, how the war has turned out in Ukraine?

James Fanell: If I was a PLA general, I would be, you know, I would be telling, uh, you know, general secretary Z. Here’s what we know about what has occurred in the Ukraine. Here’s where the Russians made mistakes. Here’s how we have, uh, overcome those mistakes.

Simone Gao: But are the Taiwanese as alert as they should be?

James Fanell: From what I’ve read is that the, you know, the crash of a, an ROC air force training aircraft that killed unfortunately, uh, Taiwan air force pilot, That seemed to have garnered more attention and criticism from the press in Taiwan than the fact that the PRC had sent 30 aircraft into their air defense identification zone.

Simone Gao: The Russian army’s performance has been less impressive than many military experts had expected. Is China’s military on the same caliber?

Seeing how the Ukraine war has been unfolding, is China less likely to take Taiwan by force?I had this conversation with James Fanell, former director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

I am Simone Gao and you are watching Zooming In.

Simone Gao: Then how would you compare Russia’s military power to that of China after seeing what happened in Ukraine?

James Fanell: Well, I mean, this is a, again, an assessment based on my, my own observations of the Chinese military over the years, and that obviously has to be couched in terms of, we don’t know, because we haven’t seen them in action. Like we’re seeing the Russians right now. Uh, but from what I see with the, the amount of training that the Chinese have, the amount of arms and capabilities that they have, their focus on joint integration, uh, it seems to me that, uh, that they have a capability that I think is greater than the Russians in terms of, of mass. Uh, Russian has a lot of forces Russia, amassed, you know, over a hundred thousand ground troops on the Ukrainian border. Uh, but I think that that when China decides to take, uh, Taiwan, they’re gonna be able Tomas a million or 2 million to be able to come across the Taiwan Strait.

Uh, and I think that’s something that people don’t really, uh, comprehend, uh, especially when you’re talking about the concept of People’s War, where the totality of the Chinese, uh, society would be brought to bear against, uh, Taiwan. Uh, but there’s, and there’s another difference. Obviously, the, the terrain, you know, it’s a land war in Russia and Ukraine, uh, going across, uh, the Taiwan, Strait’s a different, uh, endeavor. That’s why the Chinese Navy is much greater than the Russian Navy, uh, in terms of, uh, this kind of, uh, operation. And then you add in the strategic rocket force of the PLA uh, the strategic support force. I think there’s a lot there that the Chinese have capability-wise. And I think what they’ve done is they’vely used this, uh, three months of conflict as a, as a, as a schoolhouse, the Chinese military leaders, PLA leaders, central military commission are probably studying intimately studying what the Russians are doing.

Uh, they obviously have connections with the Russians. We saw the Russians and the Chinese flying together. They’re bombers in formation with fighter escorts in the sea of Japan this last week. Uh, that doesn’t happen if you don’t have close military contact. And so if the Russians and the Chinese are operating together in the sea of Japan, you can, you can very well be sure that China’s also requesting and getting intelligence and, and, and, um, feedback from the Russians on what’s working, or what’s not working. How are the, uh, Western, uh, allies, uh, supporting the Ukraine and what is Ukraine doing? So I’m sure that Russia’s are China is studying all these details and, and getting smarter and updating their war plans and their contingency plans that they have for Taiwan.

Simone Gao: After seeing what happened in Ukraine, some analysts say it almost looks like Russia is not fighting a war of the 21st century but a war in the late 19th and 20th century. Their different military branches are not well-integrated, they don’t use intelligence well, they fire heavy artillery and move their troops in big blocs. What’s your opinion on that? Is China the same way?

James Fanell: Right. That’s a good question. I mean, there’s basically this idea of, uh, attrition warfare, slow, uh, tank battles and, and, and ground forces supported by heavy fires of artillery, you know, mass bombardments on artillery at certain locations, and just kind of slugging it out like they did in World War II, in Stalingrad or something. And so I think that’s a fair assessment that, from what we’ve seen so far, I don’t think that’s too much off the mark. So then the next question that you raised and I’ve seen the discussions is whether or not that the Chinese military is wedded to the same kind of doctrine in the way they fight. And I think up until the last, uh, 20 years and maybe, uh, 10 years Chinese military doctrine, especially for the PLA army is very much probably influenced by old Soviet, uh, military doctrine that we’re seeing played out in the Ukraine.

But I do think because the Soviet Navy is now the Russian Navy and their talk, their doctrines didn’t really, I don’t think influenced the Chinese Navy and their development and the Chinese air force and the Chinese strategic rocket force, uh, in the same fashion. And so I think what we have with the PLA today is a much more modern force, not just in the weapons that they have, but in the way that they look at fighting a war. I mean, I gave a speech, um, eight years ago where we were quoting Chinese generals talking about conducting a short, sharp war. So they’re aware of this. We know that the Chinese leaders, military leaders have gone to school on Desert Storm from 19 90, 19 91. And the, uh, shock and awe campaign that the us military inflicted on Saddam Hussein, and his military. So we know that the Chinese, uh, have studied these things have tried to mimic the, and the development of their own military to be able to do these kinds of short, sharp war, uh, lightning strikes.

So I, I think that Chinese have a different doctrinal perspective when it comes to this. Now we know in 1950, when they fought in the Korean war, they fought much like the Russians are fighting today in the Ukraine, but again, that was 72 years ago or, or, or so, and I think the Chinese in the last 20 years have really adapted and altered their doctrine and have gotten much more in tune with the United States’ military, uh, way of fighting, uh, in this 21st century. And so I would expect that Chinese would operate that way.

Simone Gao: You are the one who has been sounding the alarm of how the PLA military power is advancing and in some areas surpassed the U.S.. How is the situation right now? Do you think America has the ability to protect Taiwan?

James Fanell: I’m very, very concerned about our ability, the United States’s ability, to protect Taiwan, defend Taiwan from an invasion from China. Uh, as you, as you noted, I’ve have been warning about this and, uh, what I see today, and I’m seeing more and more, uh, like-minded security officials, people that hadn’t said anything in the past few years are now starting to sound the alarm that were really in a serious situation, especially when our, our budgets that are being submitted, uh, are, are clearly not the kind of budgets that we would expect to see in the face of such a, a growing threat from the PRC and the PLA. So I worry that the, the relatively static size of the US Seventh Fleet and the Fifth Air Force and other air force, our, our, our, our Marine three Third Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, those permanently deployed kind of are former forward deployed permanent forces that we have out in, in the Western Pacific, that, that, that size and the capabilities are generally the same over the last 30 years.

Now, there’s been improvements in, in the different types of, uh, equipment that they have. And there’s been 2,500 Marines, uh, that are rotationed out of Darwin in Australia. But other than that, there hasn’t been a dramatic increase in the presence and size of the US Western Pacific military forces while China has dramatically changed and grown and altered the military balance of power in the region. China’s Navy is now the largest Navy in the world. Ours is, uh, around 297 ships, but we have to split those ships essentially between our east and west coast. So they’re not all focused and on station in the Western Pacific. So China’s advantage, even though they’re the largest Navy is even greater than just saying, they’re the largest Navy by a few, few ships. They’re now actually much larger because they’re concentrated. They’re in China, inside the first and second island chain while ours are on our west and east coast and have thousands and thousands of miles, uh, to sail before they could actually get into the combat area to help defend Taiwan.

Um, so I’m really worried that we’re, we’re not prepared. I think the people that are in the military, uh, the people that are at sea today are, are, are good Americans, and they’re, they want to do the right thing. They’re planning and practicing to do the right things to defend Taiwan. Uh, but they don’t have the resources there there’s been cuts to, uh, you know, training and maintenance funds over the years, uh, that make them less able to, you know, be as sharp as they should be. Maybe as when I was in active duty, we’re seeing more and more pictures of US Navy warships that are rusted out and not prepared, not materially ready as they could be or should be. And so I worry about all these things, and I’m very concerned that our Congress doesn’t seem to be, uh, alarmed. They should be at a, you know, it’s like a, if a house is on fire, they call the fire department and there’s a four, four alarm fire. That’s the, the highest number of alarms. You can have to get the whole fire department out to put out the big fire. And we should be at a four alarm fire status right now inside the United States Department of Defense and our Congress, as it comes to realizing that China is on the brink of doing something like we’re seeing, being done in the Ukraine.

Simone Gao: So that was what I was going to ask you. After seeing what has been happening in Ukraine, do you think Washington will be more candid or less candid in boosting the U.S. military? Do they see Russia as not as competent as they thought and so would it be similar for China or do they see China doing something similar so the threat to Taiwan is real and the U.S. had better be prepared?

James Fanell: There’s a mixed message coming out of this White House. And it’s confused people from the left, from the right side of the aisle. Uh, and then we have to look at things like arm sales, and there’s a great concern that arm sales from the United States to Taiwan, there’s been a, either a cancellation or delay of a number of, uh, weapons here in the last few months. And that’s a that’s alarming given the one thing that we we know from the experience in the Ukraine is that if we had armed up, uh, the Ukraine before the Russian invasion, it may have altered Putin’s desire to, to risk a war in Ukraine.

I know many, many people in Washington, DC, the experts, the so-called experts say, if you do that, you will be provoking China to attack. And my answer to them is, uh, that’s what you assess. However, what we know is that Chinese intend to attack Taiwan, and if we’re not going to do anything to deter them, so what’s the difference. If they’re going to come after I send arms into Taiwan, at least we have a fighting chance; if I don’t do anything, then those people in Taiwan have no chance.

And so I would suggest that we start providing them those, uh, materials, uh, those weapons as soon as possible. And that we would also establish a combined command structure in Taiwan that we composed of Taiwan military, US military, uh, Japanese military, and other members of the quad, or whoever else wants to join that, uh, to conduct, uh, training and, and, and not just training, but to have a command and control structure that would allow us to be effective. Uh, when the invasion were to occur, if it were to occur. We have such structure on the Korean peninsula today, it’s called combined forces command. It combines US and mili and Korean military together, and they sit shoulder to shoulder with each other in command centers and in the field and in the fleet. And, uh, we should be doing something very much similar, uh, towards, uh, Taiwan right now.

Simone Gao: This question has always perplexed our non-military people. Does the DOD have an existing operational plan regarding the Taiwan strait under various circumstances? If so, does the ambiguity coming out of the White House matter? What role do the President and congress play in a potential conflict over the Taiwan strait?

James Fanell: Well, you, you, it’s always natural to assume that militaries plan. I mean, each and, and plan for contingencies. Um, we have a whole, if you could look at our joint doctrine, we have operational plans O plans, and we have contingency plans, con plans. That’s part of our doctrine. You can read about it, it’s in the open, open press. Uh, I can’t talk about specific plans that the INDOPACOM has. I can just say that I was almost 30 years in the Indo-Pacific command, or then called PACOM, Pacific command. And I can say that, you know, at every level that I was at, we had a, what we call the, in the, the military high, uh, nomenclature. We have the planning shop, the 5, the J5 at the joint level, the N5 at the Navy level. And so there’s planners, there’s people on, on the staffs of these, uh, military commands inside the US military that are planners and our counterparts and other militaries are planners as well.

And so if you’re assigned, uh, to the Indo-Pacific, it’s probably a good chance that you’re planning for something that, that has to do with an invasion of Taiwan. That’s not a, that’s not a super, that’s not a secret, but your question is, well, because we have a plan, therefore we don’t have to worry so much about what Biden or the Congress say. And I, I disagree with that. I think, as I said before, the entirety of lead leading a nation into combat in terms of making decisions about what a nation will do that has to be led by the President of the United States. We’ve seen it play out in, in, in, in Afghanistan in terms of how, uh, the, the, uh, you know, the, the, uh, evacuation of Kabul and the decision making about why to lead Bhagram Air Base. These were all decision parameters, excuse me, that were set by the President of the United States.

We’ve seen it here in the Ukraine president of the United States has had the, kind of the, the most influential say, even to the partners in NATO about whether or not we would allow, uh, you know, combat aircraft and other kinds of weapons to be given to the Ukraine. And it will be exactly the same thing in a Taiwan scenario. The President of the United States will have this influence over how, uh, a fight would be, uh, engaged whether or not we would be full in or where we would try to hedge. And the Congress has a role, both constitutionally and through, you know, its ability to, I mean, in terms of authorizations of war and that nature, but also through what they authorize in terms of funding for the, the, the build up of military forces and readiness. And so both institutions have a responsibility, uh, to, uh, they have a huge responsibility in this, and it’s not just left up to the commander of INDOPACOM and his planning staff and his fielded forces to just go about and do the business of defending Taiwan. It’ll take much more than that.